Protecting Cultural Heritage By Recourse to International Environmental Law: Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability by Segate, Riccardo Vecellio
Hastings Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 27 
Number 1 Winter 2021 Article 5 
2021 
Protecting Cultural Heritage By Recourse to International 
Environmental Law: Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability 
Riccardo Vecellio Segate 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Riccardo Vecellio Segate, Protecting Cultural Heritage By Recourse to International Environmental Law: 
Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability, 27 Hastings Envt'l L.J. 153 (2021) 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol27/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings 







Protecting Cultural Heritage By Recourse to 
International Environmental Law: 
Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability 
 




Several international policy documents define the environment as 
made of “natural heritage” and “cultural heritage” together, along the lines 
of concepts such as “biosphere” or “ecosystem” which have been 
introduced relatively recently to define the complexity of human-
environment interactions.  Nevertheless, distinguishing natural heritage 
from the cultural one helps analyse situations where damage inflicted to the 
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former negatively impacts the latter.  In fact, cultural heritage sits under 
siege worldwide due to polluting activities and environmental degradation, 
which are causing irreparable damage to—or even the disappearance of—
valuable expressions of civilisations’ legacy.  Most damages are 
transboundary, thereby calling into question bilateral forms of States’ 
liability; others involve a globalised dimension of climate change, 
addressed through “trusteeships” whereby the international community 
establishes centralised compliance schemes which are built on incentives 
and sanctions while do not necessarily provide for clear-cut liabilities.  Yet, 
this uncertainty on the liability schemes to be applied to different sources 
of environmental damage to cultural heritage in peacetime remains 
underexplored in legal scholarship, which rather tends to focus on the 
protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts, on environmental 
damages exclusively considering the environment’s natural elements, on 
state liability within domestic jurisdictions only, or on liability as a 
corollary of state responsibility.  Two categories of events are to be 
assessed: those where a home damage to the environment results in damage 
to cultural heritage abroad, and those where the damage to both occurs 
directly extraterritorially; these both may occur due to state initiatives, or 
through malpractices of corporations which are neither owned nor 
controlled by the State.  Strict, absolute, or “soft” liabilities are invoked by 
private parties when their property is violated, or by States when their 
heritage as a collective good is damaged, but might also involve the 
international community as a whole when such cultural expressions are 
deemed of public interest and conceptualised as “global commons.”  When 
it comes to damages of this sort, it is unlikely that States purposively caused 
them or even deliberately refrained from preventing them; what is more, 
these damages often occur as a result of concurrent actions by multiple 
countries over extensive periods of time.  Consequently, the legal analysis 
on liabilities warrants to be framed under a broader cosmopolitan solidarity 
and burden-sharing perspective, whereby States voluntarily uphold the 
convenience of selected forms of international liability, in order to protect 
cultural heritage and contain one of the most perilous side-effects of 
deregulated anthropisation.  To this end, China’s metamorphosis from law-
recipient to law-maker status on the international plane is worth focusing 
on.  By scrutinising Beijing’s approach to (international) environmental 
law during the “Western humiliation” period, the WW2 aftermath, the 
“Cultural Revolution”, and the transition to world power status under the 
label of “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics,” it is 
possible to draw inferences on what liability schemes for cultural heritage 
protection are deemed desirable in Chinese politics and discourses.  An 
investigation of the values underpinning China’s policies over the last 
decades facilitates the tracing of the normative spillovers from 
environmental law to cultural heritage law (and vice versa), as well as the 
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Compared to the environmental catastrophes brought about by climate 
change and to the health upheavals owing to pollution, environmentally 
dependent damages to cultural heritage may seem prima facie relatively 
negligible.  And yet, cultural heritage not only matters for cementing 
feelings of belonging, but it truly represents the sense of continuity across 
generations in both peacetime and wartime;1 it embodies the ultimate 
meaning of sustainable development,2 in that it contributes to the very 
existence of identity-aware societies that stand able to value their past in 
order to secure their future.3  Cultural heritage is a living idea blending 
nature and humans, as much as a contribution to sustainable peace efforts;4 
despite its “touristicisation” the World Heritage List (“WHL”) is routinely 
blamed for, cultural heritage seems to resist globalisation, or at least to 
expose the latter’s inherent contradictions without being vanquished by it.  
Rightly or wrongly, cultural heritage has been offered even higher 
protection than civilians in several armed conflicts all throughout the XX 
century; a well-known example is that of the Second World War (“WW2”), 
when e.g., Paris, Milan,5 as well as the literary treasures of the 
Montecassino Abbey were spared thanks to deliberate choices by Allied 
and Nazi-Fascist military commanders alike.  Nowadays, monuments et 
similia are not threatened by regular armed conflicts, but by irregular forces 
(paramilitaries, rebels, terrorist, mercenaries, …) and “new” asymmetrical 
 
1. Roger Michael O’Keefe, Cultural Heritage and International Criminal Law, 
SÉBASTIEN JODOIN & MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, 120–150 (2013). 
2. Lisa Rogers, Intangible Cultural Heritage and International Environmental Law: 
The Cultural Dimensions of Environmental Protection, 29(3) HIST. ENV’T 30, 34–35 (2017) 
3. See, e.g., Hangzhou International Congress China - Culture: Key to Sustainable 
Development, The Hangzhou Declaration: Placing Culture at the Heart of Sustainable 
Development Policies, CLT-2013/WS/14 (May 17, 2013). 
4. See generally Iwona Szmelter, New Values of Cultural Heritage and the Need for 
a New Paradigm Regarding its Care, Conservation: Cultures and Connections (2013), 
https://perma.cc/7X58-Q62E. 
5. “Sir Charles Portal, Royal Air Force’s Commander-in-Chief, severely admonished 
the colonel of the fighter bombers after their incursion over Milan on 24 October 1942, 
during which the Cathedral risked to be razed to the ground, as he had heavily and 
unnecessarily put into question the loyalty of any military officer who cares about artistic 
treasures, as well as RAF’s reputation before the civilized world of today and those next-to-
come,” Fernanda Mottura, La circolazione delle opere d’arte nel diritto dell’Unione Europea 
e i limiti posti dall’ordinamento italiano 30 (2016) (unpublished dissertation, LUISS) 
(translated by author). 
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warfare techniques; in an even more widespread fashion, they are at risk 
because of climate change, pollution6 and environmental degradation,7 
which are exactly the factors this paper is premised to investigate in greater 
detail.  Here, the environment is not simply made reference to as a good to 
be protected in times of conflict8 or its aftermath, but as a legal, policy and 
conceptual framework of use when it comes to protecting cultural heritage 
in both peacetime and wartime, in a way that allows environmental 
protection to fill the gaps in cultural heritage protection, and vice versa.  
Human life is inherited together with a “code” that generations secretly pass 
onto the upcoming ones, made of interdependence and contextuality 
between culture and nature.9  Cultural legacies and symbols in their 
environmental contexts are what remains (or should remain) when time 
goes by,10 that is, what allows different generations of the same nation11 to 
recognise each other as part of the same unwritten contract built on shared 
meta-narratives bearing legal significance.12  The same paradigm applies to 
the global society when it comes to heritage of universal value, which is 
why “domestic relaxed rules protecting the cultural or natural heritage 
 
 6. See generally JOHN WATT ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION ON CULTURAL 
HERITAGE (2009).  For an exemplification in China, see Lynn G. Salmon, Airborne 
Pollutants in the Buddhist Cave Temples at the Yungang Grottoes, China, 28 ENVTL SCI. 
TECH. 805 (1994); Christos S. Christoforou et al., Passive Filtration of Airborne Particles 
from Buildings Ventilated by Natural Convection: Design Procedures 
and a Case Study at the Buddhist Cave Temples at Yungang, China, 30 AEROSOL SCIENCE 
& TECHNOLOGY 530 (1999).  
 7. One example is the water-infrastructure projects executed in view of the Běijīng 
2008 Summer Olympics, which gravely impacted the environment and, consequently, the 
cultural heritage resting therein. See Chen Shen & Hong Chen, Cultural Heritage 
Management in China: Current Practices and Problems, CULTURAL HERITAGE 
MANAGEMENT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 70, 77 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger & George S. 
Smith eds., 2010). 
8. See, e.g., Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991); G. A. Res. 47/37, (Nov. 25, 1992 
(“Stressing” preambular clause).  
9. Rodney Harrison, Beyond “Natural” and “Cultural” Heritage: Toward an 
Ontological Politics of Heritage in the Age of Anthropocene, 8 HERITAGE AND SOCIETY 24, 
30 (2015). 
10. Relatedly, “one should not forget the political aspect of the decision as to what 
is to be preserved for future generations. A central idea which accompanies the view of 
cultural heritage as a form of inheritance is its characterisation as a non-renewable resource 
akin to the environment.”  Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 61, 69 (2000). 
11. “Nation” is employed here in its proper ethnical sense, and not in its geopolitical 
connotation of “country” as it is at times confused for even in official documents (see, e.g., 
infra note 25). 
12. Peter Häberle, A Constitutional Law for Future Generations – the “Other” Form 
of the Social Contract: The Generation Contract, HANDBOOK OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
JUSTICE 215, 221–225 (Joerg Chet Tremmel ed., 2006). 
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situated in the territory of a single [S]tate, as well as the poor administrative 
enforcement of those rules, affects the interests of people residing all over 
the world, all of whom share in the common heritage of mankind.”13 
International responsibility and international liability are not 
synonymous, in that a State may be held liable for certain conducts which 
do not reach the threshold or fall within the scope of internationally 
wrongful acts.14  In extremely simplified and unavoidably vague terms, one 
may affirm that international liability is about compensating (bilaterally, 
through multilateral funds, by means of “participated” regional 
organisations’ budget, and so forth) a state or non-state foreign party for 
the harmful effects of a state or state-backed or “state-negligent” action 
without admitting to the unlawfulness of such an action (i.e., without 
accepting nominal, declarative responsibility for it, including consequences 
like international retaliation and international sovereign lawsuit), thus 
without the need for the injured party to prove neither the causal link 
between the action and the seemingly resulting harm, nor between the 
action and those state actors seemingly perpetrating it beyond a prima facie 
administrative assessment of the harm.  It is of the essence to emphasise 
that responsibility-independent liability has nothing to do with charges of 
morality: it is not a moral form of responsibility which replaces the legal 
one,15 but a different legal device which comes into play whenever it is 
unfeasible, inconvenient, unlawful, or evidence-wise untenable to invoke 
responsibility. It is a different shade or manifestation of legal responsibility 
that shifts the focus of policy priority from fault-attribution to money-
dispensation, and it might even be considered concomitantly with judicial 
intervention.  Moreover, it is especially helpful when collective actions are 
involved.  It was argued elsewhere that natural catastrophes are not only 
the product of deregulation in its meaning of “rules missing”, rather, they 
are deeply embedded in regulatory schemes as they are already designed 
 
13. Stefano Battini, The Procedural Side of Legal Globalization: The Case of the 
World Heritage Convention, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 340, 346 (2011). 
14. On the distinct application of these two doctrines, see Alexandre Kiss & Dinah 
L. Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law, TAFSIR NDIAYE & RÜDIGER 
WOLFUM, LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER 
AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH, 1131–1152 (2007); Owen McIntyre, Responsibility 
and Liability in International Law for Damage to Transboundary Fresh Water Resources, 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FRESHWATER LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 335–365 
(Mara Tignino & Christian Bréhaut eds., 2018); Tullio Scovazzi, State Responsibility for 
Environmental Harm, 12 YEARBOOK OF INT’L ENVTL. L. 43, 43 n. 2 (2001). 
15. On faultless responsibility as a device for indirect attribution of moral forms of 
responsibility, see Luciano Floridi, Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation 
of Moral Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions, 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y  A (2016), https://perma.cc/E4Q8-3FAK. 
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and operated;16 in this sense, some might interpret this faultless-liability 
concept as a form of institutionalised production of threats which are only 
redressed monetarily whilst nobody is held accountable and publicly 
shamed.  This piece will argue that faultless liability can be deemed to be 
the best possible compromise to protect cultural heritage in certain 
circumstances and political contexts, and it works in a more sophisticated 
manner compared to complete absence of shame.  It calls for a rethinking 
of policy and legal priorities, to save what can be saved and to insure against 
risks whose uninsured concretisations would bear disastrous social 
repercussions for local populations or even the global village.  Eventually, 
it caters for the regrettable truth that in the global governance of the 
environment, “acknowledgment of responsibility is only weakly linked in 
practice to accountability mechanisms unless they are formally established 
within specific legal instruments”17 (such as liability ones, indeed). 
Coherently with the rough definition of international liability just 
provided, this contribution will not examine the direct applicability of the 
international human rights law18 or international criminal law19 regimes to 
cultural heritage protection, nor will it scrutinise the attribution of state 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, per se.20  It will presuppose 
that harms can be ascribed to a defined population in a roughly identifiable 
territory, thus we will not refer to climate-change-induced migrations and 
consequent abandonment of tangible heritage or re-adaptation of intangible 
one, either.21  On the model of a variety of formal and informal, regional 
and international instruments,22 it will rather analyse: state liability as a 
component of the breach of States’ international obligations; state liability 
 
16. See, e.g., Julia Dehm, International Law, Temporalities and Narratives of the 
Climate Crisis, 4 LONDON R. INT’L L. 167, 188 (2016). 
17. Steven Bernstein, The Absence of Great Power Responsibility in Global 
Environmental Politics, 26(1) EUR. J. INT’L REL. 8, 21 (2020). 
18. See, e.g., Leonard M. Hammer, Cultural Heritage Protection and Sacred Spaces: 
Considering Alternative Approaches from Within the Human Rights Framework, 49 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73, 73–113 (2018). 
19. See generally Francesca Sironi De Gregorio, Attacking Cultural Property to 
Destroy a Community: Heritage Destruction as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide, 
1 IUS IN ITINERE 3, 3–34 (2020) (a well-updated summary on said applicability). 
 20. For an illuminating challenge to the supposition that States owe injured parties full 
compensation for internationally wrongful acts regardless of the former’s socio-economic 
conjuncture, refer to Martins Paparinskis, A Case Against Crippling Compensation in 
International Law of State Responsibility, 83(6) MOD. L. REV. 1246, 1246–1286 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/E9EK-UW7U. 
21. See Hee-Eun Kim, Changing Climate, Changing Culture: Adding the Climate 
Change Dimension to the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 18 INT’L J. OF 
CULTURAL PROP. 259, 261–65 (2011). 
22. See HANNES DESCAMPS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY (2018) (systematising most relevant conventional laws on international liability 
concerning environmental damage). 
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for injurious but non-wrongful acts, emphasising the harm rather than the 
conduct provoking it; state liability triggered by “soft” non-compliance 
procedures incapsulated in contemporary environmental agreements, 
mostly due to the fault of wilful negligence (culpable carelessness), based 
on codified or customary due diligence expectations; and particularly 
focusing on China, statutory liability of private parties before domestic 
courts of the injuring or injured State(s), especially in cases of damage to 
cultural heritage which can be reformulated as environmental damages, 
adding to the property damage per se.  These forms of liability invest 
private parties when their property is violated,23 or States when their 
heritage as public/collective good is damaged, but it might also involve the 
international community as a whole when such an heritage is deemed of 
public interest at large and conceptualised as “global commons” 
(comparably to e.g., the seabed in the UN Convention for the Law of the 
Sea).  Some damages may engage shared forms of liability; conversely, 
when numerous members of the international community are affected, it 
would perhaps be worth considering the introduction of an actio popularis 
doctrine in public international law, jointly with multilateral funds 
dedicated to these occurrences.  At any rate, as we will examine in greater 
detail infra, certain legal solutions agreed upon internationally by States are 
borderline between several typologies of liability; let us formulate an 
example.  Let us suppose we have thirty countries establishing a 
multilateral fund for compensating each other in the aftermath of potential 
transnational harm to their cultural heritage due to polluting activities from 
their businesses, where each State contributes to the fund a percentage of 
its GDP but regardless of what happens, cannot benefit from the fund for 
more than one tenth of that fund’s total endowment, because the main 
redress should come from businesses themselves and the fund enters into 
play in the gravest emergencies only.  Let us further suppose that one 
subscriber to this fund pollutes other five members because of a very 
dramatic incident occurred to one of its main factories situated along a 
strategic border, and the laws of that polluting subscriber stipulate that the 
business polluter shall pay up to a certain sum expressed in absolute terms, 
and the rest might be covered by international funding.  Thus, the private 
polluter will contribute its part to clean up the environment and try to 
restore the heritage of the five foreign States, and the State the polluter 
belongs to will draw from the multilateral fund the remaining sum, till 
reaching the cap previously mentioned, in accordance with the multilateral 
arrangement’s rules.  Under international law, is this a case of civil liability 
of the polluter through the arrangement agreed upon by “its” State, or of 
 
23. See Peter Tzeng, The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125 
YALE L.J. 1805, 1805–19 (2016) (another standpoint on the matter is that of a highly 
debatable “right to property” under international law, which will not be discussed here). 
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state liability of the polluting State?  Arguably both. This was a relatively 
straightforward example, yet needless to stress, matters in real life are often 
much more complicated.  For example, some harms are hardly quantifiable 
monetarily, and companies are subjected to different domestic regimes 
depending on whether they are a parent company, a subsidiary, and so forth. 
The two overarching purposes of this study are to demonstrate that the 
legal device of responsibility-independent international liability is a useful 
concept to frame cultural heritage protection (particularly that of the 
“commons”) in environmental legal terms, and to theorise the extent to 
which such a framing strategy would be accepted within the Chinese 
understanding of global governance and the international legal order.  The 
rationale underpinning this case-study on China is that whilst much of the 
pollution it produces remains within its borders, a non-negligible portion is 
“exported,” especially to neighbouring territories such as the Korean 
peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, or Siberia; to exemplify, 
 
[a] chemical analysis of acid rain in Japan indicates that the 
problem in Japan stems from emissions in China.  Acid rain during 
the winter in Niigata Prefecture, which is on the coast of the Sea 
of Japan, contains a mix of sulfur and sulfer oxides consistent with 
emissions from the burning of Chinese coal. Acid rain in Niigata 
contained the same quantities of the sulfur isotopes S32 and S34 
that are found in Chinese emissions.  Sulfur oxides, nitrogen, and 
other substances that cause acid rain originate from the burning of 
fossil fuels such as coal and oil.  Because the mixture of sulfur 
oxides and sulfur isotopes varies according to the type of fossil 
fuel consumed, it can be used to trace the origin of polluted air.  
The burning of coal in China produces emissions with S34 
concentrations; these are more than three times as high as that 
found in emissions from factories in Niigata Prefecture itself.  To 
get a comprehensive view, scientists checked for S34 in rain and 
snow in Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture, during 1991.  The results 
showed that quantities of the acid rain–related substance rapidly 
increased during the months of January, February, November, and 
December of 1991, when seasonal winds from the Chinese 
mainland blew across the Sea of Japan.  China’s massive 
consumption of coal, which is causing the acid rain problems in 
Northeast Asia, is certain to become a global problem in the near 
future. China refuses to allow any joint monitoring of its acid rain 
problem, insisting that it is a domestic issue.24 
 
 
24. PRADYUMNA P. KARAN, THE NON-WESTERN WORLD: ENVIRONMENT, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (2006). 
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This calls into debate both transboundary forms of pollution and polluting 
activities contributing to global climate change.  An in-depth understanding 
of China’s preferences in terms of liability is a fortiori essential due to its 
growth economically but also geopolitically within the international order.  
As Beijing tries to uphold its image as a “responsible nation”25 or 
“responsible power” [fù zérèn dàguó, 負責任大国], it will be crucial to 
monitor the differences (if any) between China and the United States 
(“US”) regarding the international environmental dossier, in its intersection 
with the preservation of artistic expressions of outstanding value.  Indeed, 
the latter are threatened every day by polluting agents released in the 
atmosphere, the soil, and the waters at unprecedented speed and volumes.26  
An analysis of US laws that might help protect cultural heritage from 
environmental hazards has already been concluded by another Author: 
unsurprisingly, it mostly points to domestic legislation whilst dedicating a 
few paragraphs to the American stances about concerted international 
efforts to tackle the issue.27  In this sense, China is certainly forward-
looking, and deserving of an analysis on his own. 
 
II. Environment and Culture 
 
One’s sense of self, both personal and cultural, is deeply 
embedded in a particular parcel of land [ . . . ].28 
 
II.1    Does the environment legally “include” 
culture? Or is it the reverse? 
 
Legacies of both nature and culture belong not simply to their 
places and peoples of origin but to all the earth and its inhabitants.  
The ethos of global ecological health, of a global genetic 
commons and of the global cultural heritage is of like concern.  
The iconic sculptures of classical antiquity are no less at home in 
London and Paris than in Athens, the Shakespearean legacy is as 
much American or German as English, and Stonehenge is the 
whole world’s property—the British merely its custodians.  Relics 
 
25. Second National Communication on Climate Change of The People’s Republic 
of China 9 (2012). 
26. See generally CESÁREO SAIZ-JIMÉNEZ, AIR POLLUTION AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 
(Balkema, 2005). 
27. Casey J. Snyder, Law, Cultural Heritage, and Climate Change in the United 
States, 36 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 95, 95–140 (2018). 
28. Marshall Islands v. United States, 39(5) ILM 1219 (2002).  
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of nature and antiquity alike warrant protection as non-renewable 
and in limited supply.  Once gone, they are gone for ever.29 
 
Protecting the environment and preserving cultural heritage are not 
exactly equivalent: first, damages to certain forms of heritage may prove 
even more irreversible than those to the environment;30 second, the 
environment exists regardless of humans and subjective human 
interpretation, as well as functionally to other species too; third, heritage 
erosion may happen acutely else than gradually; fourth, while most 
environmental damages can be economically quantified, “pricing” the 
destruction of a universally recognised monument is nearly impossible,31 
and anyway nonsensical.  This notwithstanding, the long-standing and 
simplistic juxtaposition of nature and culture rests on a false dichotomy the 
law needs to disrupt in order to protect both.  Nature and culture are distinct 
yet interdependent, thus the law needs to keep a distinction between them 
whilst never losing sight of their mutual dependency in complex human 
environments.  Destruction of—or serious damage to—cultural heritage 
due to pollution and other hazardous environment-impacting activities 
cannot be regarded as isolated incidents anymore, because of how 
numerous, how widespread they are, and the recurring patterns observable 
in their unfolding.  In fact, this is not the first work suggesting to enhance 
cultural heritage protection by recourse to environmental law concepts and 
practices: among others, one American scholar pursued the same path 
already, making the case for cultural justice to borrow from environmental 
justice in order to uphold the rights of indigenous communities.32  The 
present essay explores a different angle, though: that of prevention and 
redress of polluting effects on monuments by means of “fault-independent” 
liability schemes developed in the field of international environmental law 
(“IEL”), learning from domestic experiences.  We shall start with an 
exercise in definition. 
Defining the term “environment” can be a tedious and frustrating 
commitment, yet it seems increasingly (but not firmly) accepted it shall 
 
29. David Lowenthal, Natural and Cultural Heritage, 11 INT’L J. OF HERITAGE STUD. 
81, 85 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 30. See also Helen Phillips, Adaptation to Climate Change at UK World Heritage 
Sites: Progress and Challenges, 5(3) HIST. ENV’T: POL’Y & PRAC. 288, 289 (2014). 
31. See, e.g., CHRISTOFER LEYGRAF ET AL., ATMOSPHERIC CORROSION 3 (Wiley 2nd 
ed. 2016).  A complete compilation of documents related to threats to monuments by 
polluting agents in the atmosphere is kept by UNECE’s International Cooperative 
Programme on Effects on Materials including Historic and Cultural Monuments (ICP 
Materials); most of these documents are available online at https://perma.cc/U3CJ-B3VS. 
32. See Derek Fincham, Justice and the Cultural Heritage Movement: Using 
Environmental Justice to Appraise Art and Antiquities Disputes, 20 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y 
AND L. 43–95 (2012). 
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include intangible cultural elements.33  The Council of Europe’s (“CoE”)34 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment, signed in Lugano on 21 June 1993, includes 
only the tangible components of heritage within its definitory exercise,35 
and yet, from both a spiritual and economic viewpoint, cultural practices 
live in a symbiotic relationship with their human and natural ecosystem.  
For example, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake in the Mekong River Basin—
which is the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia and one of the world’s 
most productive wetland ecosystems—provides local populations with 
touristic attractions in the form of cultural heritage, with indigenous 
community heavily reliant on its floating villages to earn a living.36  It is 
therefore essential for firms to play a major role in advancing sustainability 
schemes capable of offsetting the externalities pollution produces over the 
cultural heritage of communities made of individuals who are neither 
producers or consumers of such firms’ products.37  Equally partial are the 
approaches that highlight the intangible dimension only, although at 
times—for example when it comes to certain maritime environments—
such a choice can be justified; the 1976 Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean 
(“Barcelona Convention”) provides a convincing reference to this end.38  In 
 
33. Ben Boer, Environmental principles and the right to a quality environment, 
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 52, 54 (Ludwig Kramer et al. eds., Edward Elgar 2017). 
34. The reader is reminded of the difference between the Council of Europe, a non-
EU institution located in Strasbourg, and the two EU institutions named Council of the 
European Union and European Council (of Ministries). 
35. “[ . . . P]roperty which forms part of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic 
aspects of the landscape” [Art.2(10), emphasis added].  Indeed, even the second component 
is arguably made of tangible monuments, although shaped by the interaction between them 
and nature as defined by humans.  There is a long-standing debate in literature on the 
possible opposability of a “public” concept of cultural heritage versus a “private” one of 
cultural property, yet the two are too often used interchangeably in international policy 
outcomes, so confusingly that the debate will not be reported or elaborated upon in the 
present article.  See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115 
PENN STATE L. REV. 641, 641–84 (2011). 
36. Malyne Neang et al., Trade-offs Between Ecosystem Services and Opportunity 
Costs in Maintaining the Tonle Sap Lake Agro-ecosystem (Cambodia), WATER AND POWER: 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN THE LOWER 
MEKONG BASIN 89, 91–93 (Mart A. Stewart et al. eds., 2019). 
37. Fredrick Ahen et al., Institutional and Market Forces: The Dominant Logic of 
Strategic Corporate Responsibility and Innovative Value Co-Creation, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS, SUSTAINABILITY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 117 (Perez 
Gonzalez et al. eds., 2013). 
38. “The area has a high representative value with respect to the cultural heritage, 
due to the existence of environmentally sound traditional activities integrated with nature 
which support the well-being of local populations” [Annex 1, Section B, Art.2(f)].  This is 
part of the 2005 amended version of the 1976 Convention, signed in Athens on 9 July 2004. 
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the European Union (“EU”), Directive 2001/42/EC,39 still in force, 
perfectly hits the target where it lays down that environmental assessments 
should provide information on both tangible and intangible heritage40 
whilst particularly emphasising its eventual vulnerability.41  Drawing also 
from Directives 85/337/EEC and 97/11/EC,42 a more recent Directive 
(2011/92/EU)43 reinforces these dicta and systematises the whole subject. 
Furthermore, Directive 2003/4/EC44 considers “environmental 
information” to concern also the “conditions of human life, cultural sites 
and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of 
the elements of the environment.”45  Finally, “[t]he extent to which each 
option takes account of relevant social, economic and cultural concerns and 
other relevant factors specific to the locality”46 is listed by Directive 
2004/35/EC,47 last amended in 2019, among the criteria to be considered 
when deciding what compensatory solution to adopt in the aftermath of an 
environmental damage within the (today-)EU.  However, no official policy 
document addresses paradoxical situations like the one that “by the simple 
magic of trading more, [the EU] could make progress towards meeting its 
reduced GHG emissions targets with almost no [change in] people’s 
consumption levels and habits”48 and what this means for the sake of 
protecting heritage Europe-wise and extraterritorially. 
 
 
39. Council Directive 2001/42, 2001 O.J. (L 197) (EC).  
40. Id. at Annex I ¶ f (the likely significant effects on the environment, including on 
issues such as biodiversity, population, human health, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, climatic 
factors, material assets, cultural heritage including architectural and archaeological 
heritage, landscape and the interrelationship between the above factors) (emphasis added). 
41. Id. at Annex II ¶ 2 (the value and vulnerability of the area likely to be affected 
due to [its] special natural characteristics or cultural heritage). 
42. Lazarela Kalezić, Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-Boundary 
Context in Montenegro, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 213, 216 (Montini Massimiliano 
et al. eds., 2011). 
43. Council Directive 2011/92, 2011 O.J. (L.92) (EC).  
44. Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 41) (EC).  
45. Id. at Art.3(1)(f) (emphasis added). 
46. Id. at Art.1.3.1 of Annex II – “Remedying of Environmental Damage”. 
47. Council Directive 2004/35, 2004 O.J. (L 143) (EC); see Kleoniki C. Pouikli, 
Overview of the implementation of the directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with 
regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage at European level, 57 
DESALINATION & WATER TREATMENT 11520, 11520–27 (2016) (European Directives are 
not immediately enforceable in the Member States: they need to be transposed into their 
domestic legal orders first; as for this one particularly).  
48. Olivier De Schutter, Linking trade and climate change: what room for human 
rights? in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW PERSPECTIVE 201, 203–4 (Mouloud Boumghar eds., 2016). 
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[C]ultural objects can be seen as part of the physical public 
space that conditions our world view and which is part of what we 
normally call “the environment” or the “landscape”.  This role of 
cultural heritage as part of public space opens the way to a holistic 
approach […] that brings together cultural and natural heritage 
and takes into account the interactive link of such heritage with 
the real life of people inhabiting it.  It is this holistic conception of 
heritage that underlies the very international efforts at developing 
normative instruments for the protection of landscape.49 
 
In 2017, within the World Heritage Convention (“WHC”) framework, 
the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage 
(“IIPFWH”) was established during the 41st session of the World Heritage 
Committee (“WHComm”), but it has yet to prove its value.  Even if the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”) has carried out some successful policy work internationally, 
resulting in a number of soft instruments adopted over the last couple of 
decades,50 there is no structural interaction between natural heritage and 
cultural heritage that is rendered justiciable (neither worldwide, nor 
regionally).  The 1964 Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration 
 
49. Francesco Francioni, Plurality and Interaction of Legal Orders in the 
Enforcement of Cultural Heritage Law, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE 
LAW 9, 11 (James Russel Grodley et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2013); see Andrew 
Butler & Ingrid Sarlöv-Herlin, Changing landscape identity—practice, plurality, and 
power, 44 LANDSCAPE RESEARCH 271, 272 (2019) (Interestingly, the Council of Europe’s 
European Landscape Convention, signed in Florence on December 20, 2000, defines the 
landscape as part of cultural heritage and not vice versa (see the relevant clause in the 
Preamble); this might bear legal significance. On this Convention). 
50. See, e.g., UNESCO, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present 
Generations Towards Future Generation, (1997) (“Conscious…” and “Bearing in mind…” 
preambular clauses, together with its Art.5); Tehran Declaration on Human Rights and the 
Environment (May 14, 2009); see also, UNESCO’s First Draft of a Preliminary Text of a 
Declaration on Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate Change (Rabat, Sep. 24, 2016) (in 
its art. 3, speaks of “Avoiding Harm” in terms of general access to justice and preventive 
measures rather than international state liability);  see also World Network of Biosphere 
Reserves (UNESCO is compiling a  list as the premise for its Man and the Biosphere 
Programme, targeting sites where extraordinarily diverse nature interacts with valuable 
cultural expressions of human presence and legacy); see also International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, 2010 Draft Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, 
(Apr. 22, 2018) (In 1995 the IUCN proposed a Draft Covenant on Environment and 
Development that explicitly enunciated the principle of intergenerational equity followed 
up by UNESCO two years later via the aforementioned Declaration; the 2013 UN Secretary-
General’s report on Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations is also 
of interest. Nevertheless, the 2017 Declaration of Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate 
Change fails to take a chance for elaborating on the climate-change threat to cultural 
heritage). 
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of Monuments and Sites, and its Australian and Chinese counterparts,51 do 
not elaborate on the nexus between environment and heritage, let alone by 
mentioning liabilities.  Neither the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) nor the WHC mention climate-change 
impacts on heritage protection, whilst the respective secretariats merely 
speak of information-sharing forms of collaboration.52  The List of Sites in 
Danger53 is to date the only nexus established between heritage in peril and 
environmental causes, as further delineated in the relevant Guidelines.54 
UNECE, for its part, commissioned precious guidelines55 and sponsored 
binding covenants.  For example, the 1991 Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context signed at Espoo, in 
Finland, mentions environmental impacts on monuments in its Article 
1(vii); disgracefully, China is not a party to it. China is not a party to the 
 
51. See Burra Charter, (1979); Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in 
China (Zhōngguó wénwù gǔjī bǎohù zhǔnzé, 中国文物古迹保护准则), (2000). Both were 
promoted by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (“ICOMOS”), a prestigious 
yet private consortium of archaeologists and other heritage and art professionals.  See also 
Declaration on the Conservation of the Setting of Heritage Structures, Sites and Areas, (Oct. 
21, 2005) (adopted in Xi’an (China) by the 15th General Assembly of ICOMOS.  Other two 
relevant private consortia are the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and 
Restoration of Cultural Property (“ICCROM”) and the World Monuments Fund). 
52. Alessandro Chechi, The Cultural Dimension of Climate Change: Some Remarks 
on the Interface between Cultural Heritage and Climate Change Law, CLIMATE CHANGE AS 
A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 161, 181–
83 (Sabine Von Schorlemer et al., Peter Lang 2014).  This, despite the fact that Art.6 
UNFCCC encodes the need for international cooperation, which one should not limit to 
interinstitutional “cheap-talking”. 
53. World Heritage Convention, Convention concerning the Protection of World 
Culture and Natural Heritage Art. 11(4) (Nov. 16, 1972); Herdis Hølleland et al., Naming, 
Shaming and Fire Alarms: The Compilation, Development and Use of the List of World 
Heritage in Danger, 8(1) TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 1, 16 (2019). 
54. World Heritage Convention, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of 
the World Heritage Convention, (Oct. 26. 2016), ¶¶ 177–191.  (These Guidelines are pre-
eminent a guidance in progressively expanding the scope of—and rationale underpinning—
cultural heritage: “[t]he OGs can be modified to accommodate developments, including 
changes in the evolving concept of heritage value or significance.  And indeed, in 1992, a 
new category of sites was introduced to the World Heritage Convention: the category of 
“cultural landscapes.”  This was a significant innovation, as it demonstrated the shift from 
monumental heritage to a more complex interaction between people and their environment); 
Francesco Bandarin, International trade in indigenous cultural heritage: Comments from 
UNESCO in light of its international standard-setting instruments in the field of culture, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
306, 309 (Christoph B. Graner et al. eds., 2012). 
55. Guidance on Land-Use Planning, the Siting of Hazardous Activities and Related 
Safety Aspects, Economic Commission for Europe, U.N. Doc.  ECE/CP.TEIA/35 (2017). 
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1992 Helsinki Convention56 on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents (also known as “UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention”) 
either, that the US has signed at least (with ratification “pending” ad 
libitum, as it is often the case with US-signed treaties).  Another UNECE-
sponsored treaty is the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (also known as 
“UNECE Water Convention”), whose scope encompasses the “landscape 
and historical monuments or other physical structures or the interaction 
among these factors[, as well as the] effects on the cultural heritage or 
socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.”57 
Placed at the forefront of the global environmentalist discourse, the 
EU represents this normative struggle between “culture” and 
“environment” at its best.  Even if it followed up the 1979 CoE Convention 
on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (also 
known as “Bern Convention”) with its own Council Directive 92/43/EEC 
on the Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (also 
known as “Habitats Directive”),58 and the interactions between the two 
“heritages” are obvious in these two mutually-shaping59 legal instruments, 
Brussels still lacks a coherent and comprehensive piece of legislation (and 
background vision) about how to concretise and enforce such linkages:60 its 
approach is still project-based.61  In the field of archaeology only, “elements 
 
56. Not to be confused with the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, known as “Helsinki Convention”, as well, then revised 
in 1992 and entered into force on 17th January 2000 as “HELCOM Convention.”  In sum, 
there are three “Helsinki Conventions” which might cause confusion with each other: the 
HELCOM, the Industrial Accidents one, and the Water one.  All of them have been signed 
in 1992. 
57. Helsinski Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, art 1.2, Mar. 17, 1992.  See James D. Fry & Agnes Chong, 
International Water Law and China’s Management of Its International Rivers, 39 B.C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 227 (2019). 
58. Nicolas De Sadeleer, Assessment and Authorisation of Plans and Projects 
Having a Significant Impact on Natura 2000 Sites, EU ENVIRONMENTAL AND PLANNING 
LAW ASPECTS OF LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS 281, 289–90 (Bernard Vanheusden et al. eds., 
2016) (judicial application of the Habitats Directive). 
59. Sebastian Oberthür et al., Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction, 
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND 
CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES 19, 30 (Sebastian Oberthür et al. eds., 
2006). 
60. Scoping study on the review of links and complementary between Natura 2000 
and cultural sites (2010), https://perma.cc/CE62-8TTR.  
61. Preserving our Heritage, Improving Our Environment: Volume II – Cultural 
Heritage Research: FP5, FP6 and Related Project (2009), https://perma.cc/RQ44-Z8QR; 
see also, Vasiliki Karageorgou, Τhe Permissibility of Projects for Interbasin Water Transfer 
under the Prism of the EU Water and Environmental Legislation, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PLANNING LAW ASPECTS OF LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS 249, 249–77 (Bernard Vanheusden et 
al. eds., 2016). 
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of the archaeological heritage” are defined by the CoE as “all remains and 
objects and any other traces of mankind from past epochs [. . .] the 
preservation and study of which help to retrace the history of mankind and 
its relation with the natural environment;”62 however, this expressed 
linkage reports mankind—and not archaeological discoveries directly—to 
the environment.  Not infrequently, natural heritage sites perfectly overlap 
with cultural heritage ones,63 to such an extent that a double-sided 
instrument which ties them together is warranted.  The CoE itself remarked 
“the importance of handing down to future generations a system of cultural 
references, improving the urban and rural environment and thereby 
fostering the economic, social and cultural development of States and 
regions,”64 thus binding States to making “the conservation, promotion and 
enhancement of the architectural heritage a major feature of cultural, 
environmental and planning policies.”65  The reader will have noted by now 
that this piecemeal approach still compartmentalises heritage in 
“archaeological”, “architectural”, and so forth, whilst to address threats 
arising from transboundary pollution and climate change, a single 
comprehensive instrument laying down clear-cut liabilities for all potential 
actors involved is urged for. 
 
II.2    Loss of traditions, displacement of identities, 
sense of alienation 
 
In English tort law, apart from physical injuries, non-physical yet 
quantifiable pure economic losses (those that appear on a balance-sheet, 
e.g., those to property) are opposed to consequential economic losses 
stemming therefrom (reputational damages, career slowdowns, etc.).  All 
these losses concur to “stranding” the underlying assets.66  Nevertheless, 
besides these damages which can be redressed monetarily, there exists a 
category of losses related to goods which cannot be translated into an 
“assets” language and cannot be traded; whilst international negotiations 
focus on the first category (economic losses), the second stands legally as 
a largely unregulated grey area.67  Translating this scheme internationally, 
under the instrumental umbrella of environmental law, non-economic 
 
62. Valletta Convention, June 1985, E.T.S 143, Art. 1(1). 
63. Natural and Cultural Heritage in Europe: Working together within the Natura 
2000 Network (2019), 13–16, https://perma.cc/JA3U-6TZ4. 
64. Granada Convention, Oct. 3, 1985, E.T.S 121. 
65. Id. at. Art.10.3. 
 66. See Ben Caldecott, Introduction to Special Issue: Stranded Assets and the 
Environment, 7 J. OF SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 1, 2 (2017). 
67. Andrea C. Simonelli, The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss and 
Damage, ETHICAL VALUES AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 213, 216 
(Hugh Breakey et al. eds., 2016). 
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losses—which may “include loss of life, human health, cultural heritage, 
ecosystem services and indigenous knowledge[, and] can occur as direct 
and indirect consequences of climate change, including negative side-
effects of adaptation” call for solutions which go beyond the mere financial 
reparation or risk-transfer makeshifts: most of these losses, e.g., to 
traditional rituals, protected species and natural habitats, water and soil, are 
irreplaceable and unmonetizable, and shall be addressed by context-
dependent policies freed from a market-efficiency mindset.68  “Loss of 
cultural identity, sense of place or indigenous knowledge, for example, are 
inextricably tied to a community’s integrity” and “no replica of the lost 
object will be regarded as equivalent to the original. [. . . ]  Whatever 
amount of money is paid to a harmed community, if the ends are 
irreplaceable, by definition such payments cannot make the community 
whole again.”69  Even the language spoken by indigenous communities is 
modelled on their habitat, their collective memory, comprising both natural 
and cultural heritage.70  Anthropological studies have placed emphasis on 
this language-nature link, demonstrating for example how the native 
aborigines (Indios) of Amazonia coined and still keep sixteen (sic) different 
expressions to indicate the green colour,71 or how in Colombia “an 
indigenous territory, although possibly demarcated and delimited, is 
defined not primarily by its borders and limits but by geographical marks 
which represent the bond between a group of humans, landscape and 
history.”72  This second example may also urge a rethinking of sovereignty 
in the shared management of cultural-environmental resources between 
indigenous and non-indigenous claimants.73 
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement finally brought the issue under the 
spotlight, yet the Warsaw International Mechanism (“WIM”) established to 
 
68. See Olivia Serdeczny, THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE 
LOSS AND DAMAGE (DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK 2016). 
69. Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Climate Loss 
and Damage, LOSS AND DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE: CONCEPTS, METHODS AND 
POLICY OPTIONS 39, 50–1 (Reinhard Mechler et al. eds., 2019). 
70. JANET MCINTYRE-MILLS, CRITICAL SYSTEMIC PRAXIS FOR SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: PARTICIPATORY POLICY DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBAL 
AGE 48 (2003). 
71. See, e.g., MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, NEL NIDO DELL’AMAZZONIA (Interlinea, 2015). 
Her anthropology-sensitive poetry production moulds an epic of the Amazonia, identifying 
and elucidating the implications of the loss of natural habitats as an impoverishment of 
language, habits, community, and ultimately identity.  See also MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, 
AMAZZONIA VERDE D’ACQUA (Mondadori, 2020); MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, AMAZZONIA RESPIRO 
DEL MONDO (Passigli, 2005); MÁRCIA THEÓPHILO, FORESTA MIO DIZIONARIO (Tracce, 2003). 
72. Juan Alvaro Echeverri, Territory as Body and Territory as Nature: Intercultural 
Dialogue?, THE LAND WITHIN: INDIGENOUS TERRITORY AND THE PERCEPTION OF 
ENVIRONMENt 230, 232 (Alexandre Surrallés et al. eds., IWGIA 2005). 
73. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the 
Development of Indigenous Group Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 291–313 (2007). 
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further the Conference’s work on the matter has proven inefficient so far.74  
As “[c]limate change forces people to make choices and face situations that 
lead to radical, but not necessarily sustainable transformations of society,”75 
cultural heritage is under siege across all continents and its damage forms 
part of said transformations, which are unsustainable insofar as they 
transfer onto the next generations a poorer legacy from the past, as well as 
the burden of living in insufficiently rooted (thus often war-ravaged) 
civilisations.  “Nuclear waste, hazardous waste disposal, the loss of 
biological diversity, and ozone depletion, for example, have significant 
effects on the natural and cultural heritage of more distant generations.”76  
Hence, it is dutiful towards those yet to come that humans agree on legal 
systems which are capable of preserving the legacy of history and pass it 
on as integrally as possible.  Whereas faults on climate change are rather 
difficult to apportion, cultural heritage should be legally shielded at least 
from transnational polluting activities liabilities thereof are possible to 
ascertain and settle.  Indeed, 
 
[t]here are a number of factors that increase the need for 
transnational environmental cooperation.  First, the breakup of 
countries means that some national environmental problems may 
become transnational concerns.  Second, enhanced remote sensing 
and terrestrial monitoring can better spot transboundary 
environmental issues.  Third, advances in technology can create 
new pollution problems, as in the case of [chlorofluorocarbons].  
Fourth, population growth places stresses on ecosystems, which 
may affect multiple countries.  Fifth, the rise of globalization and 
regionalism results in more trade and movement of factors of 
production, both of which can augment transnational pollution 
flows.  Sixth, the enhanced importance of social media offers 
 
74. “[T]he range of approaches to financing loss and damage response efforts listed 
in the initial two-year workplan for the WIM [Executive Committee] display major gaps: 
almost none were devised to apply to slow-onset events or to non-economic loss and 
damage.  Traditional insurance is designed to provide compensation for monetary damages 
triggered by sudden, unpredictable and infrequent disasters. [ . . . A]n insurance-based 
approach does not encompass an appropriate response to non-economic loss and damage.  
Risk insurance does not include any means to value or repay non-economic loss and damage, 
including loss of heritage, culture, languages and ecosystems.  Social and economic 
development concerns should be central in proposals to address loss and damage.”  Jonathan 
Gewirtzman et al., Financing Loss and Damage: Reviewing Options Under the Warsaw 
International Mechanism, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 1076, 1083 (2018); see Serdeczny supra note 
68, at 8. 
75. Mia Landauer & Sirkku Juhola, Loss and Damage in the Rapidly Changing 
Arctic, LOSS AND DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE: CONCEPTS, METHODS AND POLICY 
OPTIONS 425, 429 (Reinhard Mechler et al. eds., 2019). 
76. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable 
Development, 8 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 345, 348 (1992). 
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environmental activists a powerful tool to coalesce public opinion 
to push for transboundary pollution control and agreements.77 
 
II.3    Why “updating UNESCO” might not suffice 
 
The Parties shall encourage research, development, 
monitoring and cooperation related to [… t]he identification of 
trends over time and the scientific understanding of the wider 
effects of sulphur, nitrogen and volatile organic compounds and 
photochemical pollution on human health, including their 
contribution to concentrations of particulate matter, the 
environment, in particular acidification and eutrophication, and 
materials, especially historic and cultural monuments, taking into 
account the relationship between sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
ammonia, volatile organic compounds and tropospheric ozone  
[. . .].78 
 
Cultural heritage sits under siege worldwide due to air and water 
pollution, (illegal) waste discharging, artificial noise, global warming, toxic 
emissions, and more generally, environmental degradation and climate 
change:79 unprecedented sea storms, typhoons, and hurricanes, 
desertification, flooding, acid rain, rising sea levels, permafrost melting, 
land exploitation, oceans trash dump, extreme weather conditions and 
temperatures, coastal erosion, deforestation, and so forth, are causing 
irreparable damage to or even disappearance of valuable expressions of 
tangible and intangible heritage,80 up to the true extremes of “cultural 
genocides.”  Acidification, eutrophication, and human toxicity have 
regional effects at worst, but climate change and ozone depletion are 
 
77. Todd Sandler, Environmental cooperation: Contrasting international 
environmental, 69 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 345, 348 (2017). 
78. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to 
Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone art 8(g), May. 17, 2005, 81 
U.N.T.S 2319 (emphasis added); see also Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emission art. 6(d), Aug. 5, 
1988, 122 U.N.T.S 2030; “Concerned…” in the Preamble to the Protocol to the Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or 
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, Sep. 2, 1987, 215 U.N.T.S 1480 (none 
of the other Protocols to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
mentions damage to monuments or other culturally, historically, artistically noteworthy 
sites). 
79. JAMES NAFZIGER ET AL., TOWARDS A PRESERVATION-SUSTAINABILITY NEXUS: 
APPLYING LCA TO REDUCE THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT OF MODERN BUILT HERITAGE 
253 (2010). 
 80. See Cristina Sabbioni et al., Vulnerability of cultural heritage to climate change, 
CoE Report AP/CAT 44, 10-11 (2008), https://perma.cc/XW6Z-2ZW2. 
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problems of global reach;81 for example, higher ozone concentration causes 
the corrosion of heritage sites due to the oxidising ozone reactions.82  Not 
rarely, “[t]he damage affects not only the artistic content of the work but 
also the [edifice] where […] the artifact has a supporting function” 
architecturally.83  Tangible cultural heritage is susceptible to climate-
change-induced damage due to two elements: the effects of this 
phenomenon on its constitutive materials (like in the case of acid rains84), 
and the massive consequences for the territory where it is located (such as 
flooding).85  When on November 12, 2019 Venice experienced the second-
gravest flooding in its history and the Basilica di San Marco was severely 
damaged, the mayor credited the regrettable event to climate change.86  
Intangible heritage cannot be directly affected, yet the legacy and practices 
that revolve around biodiversity, natural cycles (involving both flora and 
fauna), animal migrations, or manmade vestiges can be severely 
endangered by this set of phenomena.87  Additionally, tangible heritage 
may bear meaning—or acquire a universal rather than local one, thus 
 
81. Maria Karoglou et al., Towards a Preservation-Sustainability Nexus: Applying 
LCA to Reduce the Environmental Footprint of Modern Built Heritage, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 
6147, 6159 (2019). 
82. Stefan Doytchinov, European UNESCO Cultural Heritage sites and the air 
pollution effects, 14 AIR POLLUTION 645, 652 (2006); for a country case-study, see Augusto 
Screpanti & Alessandra De Marco, Corrosion on cultural heritage buildings in Italy: A role 
for ozone?, 157 ENVTL POLLUTION 1513, 1513–20 (2009). 
 83. Marco Del Monte, The Cultural Heritage: Causes of damage, SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN CULTURAL HERITAGE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN 
SYMPOSIUM, BOLOGNA, ITALY, 13-16 JUNE 1989 78, 82 (1991). 
84. GABRIELA KÜTTING, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 88 (2000). 
85. By absurdity, if e.g., Venice sinks, the WHC is no longer applicable, and even 
the 2011 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage only 
protects a cultural object after 100 years of being partially or totally immersed [Art.1.1(a)]. 
86. John Henley and Angela Giuffrida, Two people die as Venice floods at highest 
level in 50 years, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/8XYP-JP39; Acqua alta a 
Venezia, toccati 187 cm. Allerta Basilica di San Marco. Anziano fulminato [High Water in 
Venice], QUOTIDIANO (Nov. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/B24E-HGNX.  See also Jonathan 
Jones, Venice has the battle against extreme weather down to a fine art, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
12, 2012), https://perma.cc/KQA2-6TD7; Tara Law, It’s Not Just Flooding in Venice. 
Here’s How Climate Change Threatens World Heritage Sites Everywhere, TIME (Nov. 22, 
2019) https://perma.cc/7VBL-ATW5. 
 87. Elizabeth Thomas, Protecting Cultural Rights in the South Pacific Islands: Using 
UNESCO and Marine Protected Areas to Plan for Climate Change, 29(3) FORDHAM ENVTL 
L. REV. 413, 417–420, 440, 464 (2018) (“[i]n Papua New Guinea, many indigenous peoples 
believe that animals, plants, geographical features, and objects have spirits, tying their 
beliefs in those spirits to the natural world.  [Similarly,] the Maasai tribes have an almost 
sacred relationship with cattle and the lands where their animals feed[,] one tribe on the 
island of Chuuk believes that their ancestors’ spirits inhabit the coral reefs that surround 
their homes[, and [i]f the Chamorros cannot access their island, they risk losing access to 
where they believe their ancestral spirits reside.”). 
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“upgrading” its “status” before the international community—because of 
its “association with events, living traditions, ideas, beliefs or artistic and 
literary works of outstanding universal significance.”88  One consequence 
is that relocating immovable heritage highly decreases its context-
dependent value,89 so much that its uniqueness might be rendered 
meaningless.  In fact, “[t]he ‘lived experience of culture’, the ‘identity’, 
‘belonging’, and ‘sense of place’ together with the values, traditions, and 
cultural practices need to be taken into consideration to determine the 
acceptability of the climate change adaptation solution.”90  This 
notwithstanding, the reader is advised that cultural practices revolving 
around monuments (or other types of “physical” heritage) are, from an 
economic and status-appraising perspective, not necessarily value-
enhancing, due to the “predisposition” of certain tangible heritage to be 
neglected, deserted, damaged, or even destroyed by the very same people 
who crafted it in the first place, as part of a cultural ritual which might prove 
hard to understand, yet shall be never interfered with: 
 
We can all sit around and nod our heads sagely when we are 
told that the destruction by the Zuni of their war gods forms part 
of a cultural practice that should be respected and that the attempt 
to preserve these gods would be culturally disrespectful; or 
likewise, when the Igbo people destroy their mbaris as part of a 
cultural practice, after having painstakingly erected them.  Yet no 
such indulgence was evident when the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan dynamited the World Heritage-listed, sixth century 
Buddhas of Bamiyan, having described them as being “idols” and 
thus religiously offensive.  The cases clearly have significant 
differences, one of the more important in cultural terms being that 
the Taliban were destroying something that belonged not to their 
own culture, but arguably to someone else’s, although they 
claimed a cultural imperative for the act of destruction.91 
 
 
88. Rosemary J. Coombe et al., Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and 
Trade: Perspectives from the Dynamics of Cultural Heritage Law and Policy, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
272, 284 (Christoph B. Graber et al. eds., 2012). 
89. CHERYL BENARD, ELI SUGARMAN, & HOLLY REHM, CULTURAL HERITAGE VS. 
MINING ON THE NEW SILK ROAD? FINDING TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS FOR MES AYNAK AND 
BEYOND. Conference Report, June 4–5, 2012, School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University 41–42 (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2012). 
90. Elena Sesana, et al., Adapting Cultural Heritage to Climate Change Risks: 
Perspectives of Cultural Heritage Experts in Europe, 8 GEOSCIENCES 305, 320 (2018). 
91. Fiona Macmillan, The protection of cultural heritage: Common heritage of 
humankind, national cultural “patrimony” or private property?, 64(3) N. IR. LEGAL Q. 351, 
355 (2013). 
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In sum, there are potentially countless variables to consider when 
attaching economic value to cultural heritage for the purpose of e.g., 
quantifying damages (thus requesting appropriate compensation), splitting 
liabilities, or assessing insurance-covered risks.  Value variation may be 
attributed to tangible heritage depending on the intangible practices that 
either valorise or risk compromising said heritage’s survival and prosperity.  
Furthermore, heritage of universal value calls for aggravated guardianship 
and financial burdens on its custodians, and insuring it against serious 
damage up to destruction might be impractical even for States; such 
heritage is, so to speak, of common concern for mankind.92 
Besides the tangible/intangible dichotomy, which has already been 
problematised elsewhere93 and comes as particularly inappropriate to 
appreciate the interpenetrations between nature and monuments through 
non-Western lenses,94 a possibly more relevant distinction is that between 
movable and immovable objects; the former UNESCO’s Chief of Legal 
and Treaty Section (International Standards) so recalls: 
 
The fact that in many countries Cultural Heritage and 
property is often protected by legislation does not, per se, exclude 
the climate change threats.  First, with regard to immovable 
Cultural Heritage, the law cannot remove it from its situs and 
protect it fully from the impact of nature.  Second, with regard to 
movable cultural property, the law can organize a removal of the 
property from its situs and its gathering in museums, which does 
protect from most, not all, impacts of nature.  However, museums 
can hardly protect from flooding or other serious effects of climate 
change.  For instance, some museums in the Czech Republic had 
 
92. Thomas Cottier et al., The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change, 
52 A.V.R. 293, 297–298, 301–302 (2014) (“In the international law discourse, Common 
Concern is generally discussed as distinct from the doctrine of common heritage of mankind 
[ . . . ].  Yet, its role and contents have not been clarified. It has been discussed as a potential 
foundation of a human right to the environment. While often limited to environmental law, 
the concept has also been put forward as a foundation for international human rights 
protection in general[, but] its relationships to public goods and to other legal principles 
have not been explored[, included vis-à-vis tangible heritage . . . ].  Recourse to Common 
Concern both in the literature and in treaty language suggests that it stands for the 
proposition of a shared problem and shared responsibility, and for an issue which reaches 
beyond the bounds of a single community and [S]tate as a subject of international law. [. . .  
In any case,] Common Concern does not fundamentally alter the paradigms of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and of territoriality.  But it may modify jurisdictional 
boundaries in assuming enhanced and shared responsibilities among [S]tates.”). 
93. See, e.g., Riccardo Vecellio Segate, Reconceptualising Musical Treasures in 
Italy, the EU and the World: The Functional Legacy of Performativity, 24 ART ANTIQUITY 
& L. 199, 209 (2019). 
94. KAROLINA KUPRECHT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CULTURAL PROPERTY CLAIMS: 
REPATRIATION AND BEYOND 42 (2014). 
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to face unexpected floods. [. . .]  But climate change can do more 
than flooding a territory, including museums and collections.  
From a legal perspective, it could go as far as cancelling a territory 
which is one of the constitutive elements of a State. [. . .] Any 
cultural property still on the territory would self-evidently no 
longer be legally protected by national legislation nor by 
international law […].95 
 
The same Author observed that at the time they were negotiated, most 
UNESCO-sponsored intergovernmental binding instruments were not 
ready to identify climate change as a key future challenge, and this might 
explain the lack of specific commitments to preserving cultural heritage 
from climate change-related threats.96  He also argues it is common sense 
for States to read the relevant Conventions in light of current trends,97 yet 
he fails to acknowledge that an international legal order is in place exactly 
for avoiding risky overreliance on States’ “common sense,” which far too 
often derails from the common good to seek short-term political gains 
instead.  Moreover, most States do not have the means to act sua sponte,98 
as they are traversed by civil conflicts which intensify climate-change 
dangers by multiplying the sources of instability.  The case of Mali is 
exemplary in this respect; terrorist contempt to monuments has already 
been addressed and satisfactorily described by—inter alia—the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)99 and 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”),100 yet such terrorist attacks act in 
combination with environmental forces: 
 
the three mosques of Djingareyber, Sankoré and Sidi Yahia 
in Timbuktu, Mali [. . .], bear testimony to the physical and social 
 
95. Guido Carducci, What Consideration is Given to Climate and to Climate Change 
in the UNESCO Cultural Heritage and Property Conventions?, CLIMATE CHANGE AS A 
THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 129, 130 
(Sabine von Schorlemer and Sylvia Maus eds., 2014). 
96. Id. at 137. 
97. Id. at 139. 
98. Indeed, even Art.5 WHC contains progressive rather than absolute obligations, 
in line with the general phrasing of economic, social and cultural rights in public 
international law.  Chechi, supra note 52, at 187–188.  
 99. See Serge Brammertz et al., Attacks against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War: 
Prosecutions at the ICTY, 14(5) J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1143, 1168 (2016). 
100. See Derek Fincham, Intentional Destruction and Spoliation of Cultural 
Heritage Under International Criminal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 149, 183–
88 (2017); Karolina Wierczyńska and Andrzej Jakubowski, Individual Responsibility for 
Deliberate Destruction of Cultural Heritage: Contextualizing the ICC Judgment in the Al-
Mahdi Case, 16 CHIN. J. INT. LAW 695 (2017); Yaron Gottlieb, Attacks Against Cultural 
Heritage as a Crime Against Humanity, Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287 (2020). 
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impacts of climate change (desertification).  On the one hand, 
projected changes show that in the future the area of Timbuktu 
will face a decrease in average rainfall and an increase in 
atmospheric temperature, which will surely contribute to desert 
encroachment and sand blown damage.  Another climate factor 
that deserves attention is the increase in extreme precipitation 
events.  Heavy rains in 1999, 2001 and 2003 damaged or caused 
the collapse of traditional earthen buildings and mud mosques.  
Moreover, the desertification in the region of Timbuktu is an 
important source of stress to the three mosques because it might 
lead the migration of the local population, including the local 
craftsmen, which are involved in the restoration process of the 
mud structures of the mosques.101 
 
The WHC is regrettably fraught with loopholes: first, the State where 
a listed heritage in danger is located (“primary State”) bears primary but 
not exclusive responsibility over its protection;102 second, the 
complimentary protection of other States may enter into play only under 
consent of and upon request by the primary State;103 third, all those “other 
States” are obliged not to deliberately violate such heritage,104 whilst might 
do so “accidentally.”  These formulations result in the fact that no State—
neither the primary one, nor the others—bears unqualified obligations to 
protect cultural heritage: the obligations of the primary State are non-
exclusive and dependent on its resources, those of the others can go 
unfulfilled whenever the primary State does not permit foreign 
interferences and whenever damaging actions are not voluntary.  The 
“international community” has no right to intervene, either, 105 although it 
might well have residual legal interests to protect.  As such, a more 
contemporary reading of the Convention is not enough: this instrument 
needs to be rewritten substantially; it is the epitome of a treaty whose high 
compliance rates indicate weakness (of the treaty requirements) rather than 
effectiveness (in the accomplishment of its purpose).106 
 
101. Chechi, supra note 52, at 167.  The last sentence from this quotation also 
unearths the delicate interrelationship between the tangible (mosques) and intangible 
(artisanship) expressions of the same heritage.  
102. 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, supra, note 53, at Art.4. 
103. Id. at Art.6(2). 
104. Id. at Art.6(3). 
105. Roger Michael O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the 
International Community as a Whole?, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 189 (2004).  
106. Edward J. Goodwin, The World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and 
Compliance, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT. L. & POL’Y 157, 189 (2009). 
5 - VECELLIOSEGATE_HELJ V27-1_ABBY_MCG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/20  2:02 PM 




Other instruments related to broad interpretations of human rights 
treaties are more and more invoked too, often unsuccessfully;107 however, 
said mechanisms do “not allow either the protection of the environment per 
se nor an ordinary compensation of the damage caused to the 
environment.”108  This is why, from a doctrinal viewpoint, even seeking to 
protect cultural heritage by recourse to environmental law might not 
necessarily suffice, unless it is clearly argued that the damage to a 
monument—similarly to that to an ecosystem—constitutes a violation of 
legal rights held by specifically identifiable individuals or collective 
groups.109  In the cultural heritage field, though, pleading successfully is 
even harder: in the Ahunbay case, the Court in fact confuted the existence 
of an individual right to cultural heritage preservation,110 and nothing would 
have changed if the site were a UNESCO-listed one; the dam was delayed 
because of legal claims submitted by NGOs and sponsors framing the issue 
in environmental terms (even though the prospected flooding of that 
heritage would have been artificially caused),111 exactly because the 
cultural-heritage protection framework is legally flawed.112  Claims erga 
 
107. See Ottavio Quirico, Jürgen Bröhmer, & Marcel Szabó, Linking trade and 
climate change: What room for human rights?, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 7, 25 (Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud 
Boumghar, eds, 2016); Ottavio Quirico, Systemic integration: Between climate change and 
human rights in international law?, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RIGHTS 31 (2017); BRIDGET LEWIS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS (2018); KEN CONCA, AN UNFINISHED FOUNDATION: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 119–147 (2015); Alan Boyle, Climate Change, the 
Paris Agreement and Human Rights, 67 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 759 (2018). 
108. Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, International Litigation and State Liability for 
Environmental Damages: Recent Evolutions and Perspectives, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY 
AND BEYOND 27, 47 (Jiunn-rong Yeh [台大法律系] ed., 2017). 
109. Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law beyond the Schism, 2 
TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 347, 388 (2011) (“Especially in Europe, where private 
international law claims arising out of transboundary pollution of monuments benefit from 
«the EC Rome II Regulation, which ensures by means of an option opened for the claimant 
that the most compensatory—and therefore the most pollution-repellent—law will apply.”). 
110. Zeynep Ahunbay et al. v. Turkey, App No. 6080/06 HUDOC (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/DXY2-W3E9.  An essential summary can be found at https://perma.cc 
/7ECG-ZUCL. 
111. Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying 
Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 183, 233–235 (2003). 
 112. See generally Sarah Mason-Case, On being companions and strangers: 
Lawyers and the production of international climate law, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 625 (2019) 
(transnational networks of environmental lawyers are more active and organised compared 
to cultural-heritage ones, thus proving more effective in both lawyering per se and 
lobbying); see also Pascal Olivier Girot, The Darien Region Between Colombia and 
Panama: Gap or Seal?, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND NORMS IN 
A GLOBALIZING WORLD 172, 190 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2002) (example of combined 
environmental-heritage mobilisation). 
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omnes113 need to be substantiated with evidence that the damaged site was 
considered of universally outstanding value for the artistic memory of 
mankind.  And even so, as demonstrated by further leading case-law, it is 
extremely arduous to enforce a supposedly universal legal entitlement to 
protect certain goods or sites:114 a decision issued by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in 2007115 regarding the Elbe Valley proves these 
difficulties at their best, insofar as a WHL site was endangered by a 
dismissive street consultation and no public institution in Germany proved 
able to comply with the State’s obligations under the 1972 Convention.116  
No liability of Germany for this mismanagement was established before the 
“international community,” the only consequence being the dropping of the 
site from the List117 (which simply spirals a vicious circle of non-
protection).118  When a WHC site is listed as “in danger”, the best the 
Convention allows for is a relatively small contribution towards adaptation 
costs for adjusting policies;119 as such, no compensation is provided: neither 
by third countries (e.g., major world polluters) to the primary State for the 
negative repercussions of climate change, nor by the primary State to the 
“international community” when the damage occurs domestically (e.g., 
because of negligence in exercising due diligence).  This notwithstanding, 
in a few occasions the political blaming which accompanies a site’s 
(forthcoming) registration on the List of World Heritage in Danger does 
trigger wiser decision-making from governmental authorities, like with the 
case of Lake Baikal and a pipeline rerouting across Siberia.120  As for the 
Special Climate Change Fund established by the Conference of the Parties 
 
113. See Alessandro Chechi, Risks Relating to the Protection of Cultural Heritage: 
From Climate Change to Disasters, LEGAL RISKS IN EU LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES 
ON LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE 199, 218 (Emilia 
Mišćenić, Aurélien Raccah eds., 2016).  
114. Andrzej Jakubowski, Resolution 2347: Mainstreaming the protection of 
cultural heritage at the global level, 48 QUEST. INTL. L. 21, 26 (2018). 
115. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 695/07, (Decision of May 8, 2007). 
116. Christian J. Tams, Addendum to the “Cultural Heritage of Mankind” Entry, A 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS 50, 51 (Helmut Volger, ed. 2nd ed, 
2010). 
117. Caroline Y. Robertson, Cultural Heritage of Mankind” Entry, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIPS TO CULTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICS 175, 183–184 
(Oliver Parodi, Ignacio Avestaran, Gerhard Banse eds., 2011); see Battini, supra note 13, at 
356–357. 
 118. See Diana Zacharias, Cologne Cathedral versus Skyscrapers – World Heritage 
Protection as Archetype of a Multilevel System, 10 MAX PLANCK UNYB 273, 318–322 
(2006) (on the removal of properties from the WHL). 
119. RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 217 (2005). 
120. See Battini, supra note 13, at 354–355. 
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to the UNFCCC and also covering adaptation costs,121 it seems prima facie 
inapplicable to cultural heritage and is anyway limited to assisting 
developing countries. 
 
II.4  Coupling enemies: regulatory compliance and 
wartime overfocus 
 
When harm occurs notwithstanding compliance with relevant 
regulations, inter-regime (i.e. based on both environmental law and cultural 
heritage law) submissions are important also because court shields often 
come from “regulatory compliance defence” and evidentiary challenges 
related thereto,122 which may involve either domestic or international 
regulations and foster instances of “regime shopping.”  Acceptance of this 
defence by international/domestic courts depends on several factors, e.g., 
on whether the regulation at hand was a “standard” or a proper law (e.g., 
administrative order); 
 
[t]he idea is that the administrative authority, when granting 
a licence and setting permit conditions, cannot take into account 
the possible harm that the licenced activity might cause to all 
possible third parties. […] Meeting the conditions of a permit is 
just a minimum. A plant owner has to take all possible precautions 
as required by tort law in order to avoid causing harm to third 
parties through his licensed activity.  [Moreover,] the non-
responsibility of a [S]tate based on the fact that it complied with 
international law is without prejudice to its liability under 
domestic law, or to the liability of private actors that may have 
acted in compliance with standards based on the international 
agreement. [Similarly, but to the opposite effect,] when the rule of 
international law on which the claim is based is incorporated in 
domestic law, it does retain its international character.123 
 
These considerations would obviously sound too risky and 
unpredictable for any entrepreneur to run a business, which is why too 
many environmental cases are still settled amicably (i.e. extrajudicially) by 
 
121. Global Environment Facility Council, GEF/C.24/12 (Oct. 15, 2004), 
Programming to implement the Guidance for the Special Climate Change Fund adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change at its Ninth Session, ¶ 17(a), 40–57, https://perma.cc/B8BX-CEXL. 
122. Jutta Brunnee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability 
Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 351, 354 (2004).  
123. André Nollkaemper, Cluster-litigation in cases of transboundary 
environmental harm, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL 
REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 11, 26–27, 32 (Michael G. Faure, Song Ying, 
eds., 2008). 
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applying equitable criteria for redressing a caused damage without 
incurring in other legal consequences.  
Another limit that makes the application of international liability 
schemes taxing in practice is the overfocus of relevant international laws 
on conflict situations.124  This is a long-standing bias in China, too: 
 
There is one great law to protect [the patrimony].  In times of 
military invasion, the people from other countries cannot take or 
destroy it.  Those who destroy it can be forced to make 
reparations. This is called international law.125 
 
Yet, the most telling example is that when UNESCO was founded, its 
primary mission was identified in post-war reconstruction and 
rehabilitation,126 such a legacy producing consequences still today.  “The 
drafters of the World Heritage Convention actually deleted the phrase “in 
time of peace” from the agreement.”127  Differently from that of the 
environment,128 the protection of cultural heritage suffers from an 
unbalanced emphasis placed on wartime instruments129 and, within the 
 
124. See Christopher Greenwood, State Responsibility and Civil Liability for 
Environmental Damage Caused by Military Operations, 69 INT. LAW STUD. 397, 397–415 
(1996), for an overview of these laws. 
125. Translated excerpt from a letter by the entrepreneur Zhāng Jiǎn [张謇] to some 
of his Chinese friends, dated approximately 1890, as reported in Lisa Claypool, Zhang Jian 
and China’s First Museum, 64 J. ASIAN STUD. 567, 570 (2005). 
126. MIRIAM INTRATOR, BOOKS ACROSS BORDERS: UNESCO AND THE POLITICS OF 
POSTWAR CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1945–1951, 2–6 (2019). 
127. Wangkeo, supra note 111, at 200. 
128. Mansour Jabbari-Gharabagh, Legal Perspectives for the Protection of the 
Environment Against the Effects of Military Activities During International Armed Conflict, 
PhD thesis (Université Laval, 1997) 94, https://perma.cc/44ZY-CH7T; see Arie Afriansyah, 
State Responsibility for Environmental Damage during International Armed Conflict Post 
the UNCC, 10 INDONESIAN J. INT'L L 377 (2013); see also Arie Afriansyah, The Adequacy 
of International Legal Obligations for Environmental Protection during Armed Conflict, 3 
INDON. L. REV. 55 (2013).  The UN International Law Commission, https://perma.cc/3ETB-
8NKX (see the outcomes and proceedings of their work); Bernard K. Schafer, The 
Relationship between the International Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental 
Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct Are Permissible during 
Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 287 (1989) (to trace the development of the law through a 
military prism, referring to this less recent analysis might be of interest).  
129. See generally Caitlin V. Hill, Killing a Culture: The Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage in Iraq and Syria under International Law, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
191 (2016); DAVID JAMES BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1st 
ed. 2008); David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14 DEPAUL 
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2004).  Interestingly, framing massive destruction of 
cultural heritage in environmental law terms might prove convenient even in terms of 
“responsibility to protect”, as the latter can be invoked for environmental crimes, whilst it 
appears difficult to argue it would be invokable for damage to cultural heritage per se. 
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humanitarian context, on the distinction between military and non-military 
targets.130  Besides UNESCO131 and non-UNESCO132 declarations, 
conflict-centred binding provisions include the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, but also, more recently, the 2017 UN Security 
Council Resolution 2347 and the “semi-binding” UN General Assembly 
(“UNGA”) Resolution 2199 on Iraq, in 2015.  
 
However, at least with regard to gross violations of the 
international obligation to respect cultural heritage—such as the 
intentional destruction of monuments of universal importance—
it seems that an opinio juris as to their unlawful character also in 
peace time is emerging.  This is witnessed by the world-wide 
condemnation of the acts of destruction by the Taliban of the 
great Buddha of Bamyam in 2001.  It is confirmed by the […] 
resolve that has led to the unanimous adoption in 2003 of the 
UNESCO Declaration Concerning Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage.  This declaration is an instrument of soft 
law.133 
 
The reader must have noticed that the stakes remain very high: the 
destruction must be intentional, and the applicable monuments are only  
 
130. E.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against 
Property or a Crime Against People, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L., 336, 365–367 
(2016). 
131. Such as the 2015 Saint Petersburg Declaration on the Protection of Culture in 
the Areas of Armed Conflicts. 
132. Like the 2016 Abu Dhabi Declaration on Heritage at Risk in the Context of 
Armed Conflicts, promoted by ICOSMO. 
133. Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural 
Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L., 1209, 1219 (2004).  
Notably, Art.2(1) of this Declaration provides for the protection of “cultural heritage linked 
to a natural site.” 
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those whose universal importance is acknowledged.134  Regionally, luckily, 
the threshold may be significantly lower; this is the case in Europe, where 
the scope135 of the 2017 CoE Convention on Offences relating to Cultural 
Property “merges” those of the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
and the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property, thus including both movable and immovable objects and 
disapplying any distinction between armed conflicts and peacetime.  
Unfortunately, the international community seems not yet ready to uphold 
comparably wide stances at the global level, and the CoE Convention itself 
was ratified by Cyprus and Mexico only – the second ratifier should not 
surprise insofar as the Convention is open to non-Council members too, 
mostly by invitation.136  In sum, this Convention has not yet entered into 
force, and arguably several decades will go by before it achieves substantial 
consensus, if ever; meanwhile, heritage under siege due to environmental 
reasons cannot wait, which is why a recourse to environmental legal tools 
is rendered unavoidable.  What is more, the Convention provides for 
sanctions and criminal penalties without designing a proper liability regime 








134. See Ayman Abdel Tawar, The Assessment of Historic Towns’ Outstanding 
Universal Value Based on the Interchange of Human Values They Exhibit, 2 HERITAGE 1874 
(2019) (explaining the current and potential criteria for insulating universally valuable 
heritage from “the rest”); Kati Lindström, Universal heritage value, community identities 
and world heritage: Forms, functions, processes and context at a changing Mt Fuji, 44 
LANDSC RES. 278 (2019); Patrick R. Patiwael, Peter Groote, Frank Vanclay, Improving 
heritage impact assessment: An analytical critique of the ICOMOS guidelines, 25 INT. J. 
HERITAGE STUD. 333 (2019); Alice Palmer, Legal Dimensions to Valuing Aesthetics in 
World Heritage Decisions, 26(5) SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 581 (2017); see also Lynn Meskell, 
Claudia Liuzza, Enrico Bertacchini, Donatella Saccone, Multilateralism and UNESCO 
World Heritage: Decision-making, States Parties and political processes, 21 INT. J. 
HERITAGE STUD. 1 (2015) (on the politics underpinning the List’s inscriptions); Enrico 
Bertacchini, Claudia Liuzza, Lynn Meskell, Donatella Saccone, The politicization of 
UNESCO World Heritage decision making, 176 PUBLIC CHOICE 95 (2016) (“Universality” 
is sometimes recognised only after reconstruction of demolished heritage, as its value lies 
in the testimony of post-war rebuilding and possibly reconciliation);  see Harold Kalman, 
Destruction, mitigation, and reconciliation of cultural heritage, 23(6) INT’L J. HERITAGE 
STUDIES 538, 543 (2017). 
135. Council of Europe Convention on Offenses relating to Cultural Property, art. 
2(a), 2(b), May 19, 2017. 
136. Id. at art.27(1); 28(1); see also Explanatory Report, at ¶ 149, https://perma. 
cc/7Z6Z-WZXX. 
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II.5    From the environment to culture, and back 
 
The previous sections demonstrated that protecting cultural heritage 
by recourse to IEL may help, but it is not free from loopholes, as the latter 
field is still embryonical.  Bearing this in mind, what other practical 
elements of IEL may cultural heritage law draw inspiration from?  First, 
several soft-law instruments drafted by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (“UNEP”) establish international environmental impact 
assessment’s “soft obligations,” by calling for issuing environmental 
impact assessments (“EIAs”) before executing all projects likely to 
significantly impact the environment, where such an environment is 
understood in a comprehensive fashion as to incorporate cultural practices 
and monuments.137  Even the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), that protects also cultural heritage,138 might be 
deemed to implicitly suggest the adoption of EIAs.139  The existence of 
EIAs is one of the key reasons why cultural heritage protection should be 
incorporated in the environmental law regime or framed in environmental 
protection language; indeed, no comparable procedure exists for the 
prevention of negative impact on cultural heritage internationally, and in 
any respect, the combined effects of the two harms would be more 
persuasive arguing.  Cases where ex ante assessments of potential 
perilousness have proven decisive are uncountable, and cultural heritage 
protection usually succeeds when it forms part of EIAs-resulting objection 
claims.  In Europe, the case of the rejected construction of the hydroelectric 
power plant “Buk-Bijela” between Serbia and Montenegro represents an 
enlightening example of transboundary occurrence shaped by strategic 
environmental assessments, whose outcome was the preservation of the 
UNESCO-protected “Durmitor” National Park along the Tara River.140  
The same can be affirmed with regards to countless other loci amoeni, such 
as the ancient Albanian port city of Durrës, displaying vestiges from the 
Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman dominations; there, it proved “useful for 
both policy and practical purposes to consider cultural heritage protection 
 
137. ALASTAIR NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 133–141 (1st ed. 2008)(With 
reference to the US, the amended National Environmental Policy Act, at §101[b](2,4), 
provides that “[t]he Federal government use all practicable means [. . .] to assure for all 
Americans safe, healthful, productive and aesthetically and culturally pleasant 
surroundings [. . . and to] preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of [their] 
national heritage.”) (emphasis added). 
138. Arts. 149; 303. 
139. Gerd Winter, International Principles of Marine Environmental Protection, 
HANDBOOK ON MARINE ENVIRONMENT: PROTECTION SCIENCE, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABLE 
MANAGEMENT 585, 599 (Markus Salomon & Till Markus eds., 2018). 
140. See Kalezić, supra note 42, at 220–224. 
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law not as a separate concept but as an integral part of environmental law 
as a whole.”141 
Along similar rails, cultural heritage protection claims succeeded 
when pleaded jointly with environmental considerations in leading 
arbitration cases: 
 
[i]n Glamis Gold (2009) […], the ICSID tribunal rejected the 
claim of a Canadian company that the stringent regulations 
adopted at the federal and state levels on the conduct of mining 
operations in California would amount to indirect expropriation 
and breach of legitimate expectations of the foreign investor.  The 
cultural value of the mining site as ancestral land of a tribal 
community of Native Americans, together with compelling 
environmental considerations, was a factor in support of the 
legitimacy of the regulatory measures imposed by the United 
States’ authorities in view of protecting the environment and 
landscape value of the relevant territory.142 
 
This aligns with the linkages between energy and the environment, 
witnessing virtually no claim submitted to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration for purely environmental matters and yet incorporating 
environmental chapters (e.g., on environmental sustainability or remedies 
for environmental damage) as a substantial argument of energy 
submissions.143 
The concept of in dubio pro natura—spillovering terminologically 
(yet reversed conceptually) from the in dubio pro reo adjudicating rationale 
in criminal trials—has been recognised as a valid principle of 
environmental law in several civil liability cases all around the world;144 
coherently, one might make the case for an in dubio pro monumento145 (or 
in dubio pro cultura) principle in cultural heritage law. 
As for the reverse, that is, environmental protection by means of 
cultural heritage provisions, corporations can lay the foundations of more 
 
141. Helga Turku, Cultural Property, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development: 
The Case of the Ancient City of Durres, 25 HASTINGS ENVT’L L.J. 121, 138 (2019). 
142. Francioni, supra note 49, at 19 (emphasis added). 
143.See Tamar Meshel, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural 
Resources and/or the Environment: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW [MPEiPro] § 15 (2016). 
144. Yann Aguila, Jorge Enrique Viñuales, A Global Pact for the Environment: 
Conceptual Foundations, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 12, 
18 n.44 (Yann Aguila, Jorge Enrique Viñuales eds., 2019). 
145. George Suetonio Ramalho, A tutela jurídica do patrimônio histórico e cultural: 
O exemplo do Centro Histórico de João Pessoa 49 (2016) (MSc thesis, Universidade 
Católica De Santos); Fabiana Santos Dantas, O direito fundamental à memória 75 (2008) 
(PhD thesis, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco) 
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grounded client bases via adding the non-profit dimension of protecting 
cultural heritage, whose preservation yields the safety of consumers’ 
feelings of belonging and sense of roots; this “trust capital” spills over 
environmental protection up to ensuring the sustainable development of 
and “fidelity” to the business.  Such a process is profitable, as enterprises 
are increasingly realising that profit must be guided by “the accumulation 
of institutional, relational, moral and spiritual capital in society as 
constituent parts of their total impact on social capital.”146  Any public-
private partnership based on trust cannot neglect liability schemes designed 
to cater for prompt and full restoration and compensation in the event of 
environmental and/or cultural damage. 
 
III.  International legal framework on (environmental) liability of 
States 
 
Although international (personal and state) liability remains 
understudied, it represents an essential redress mechanism in 
environmental and cultural heritage law: in these fields, international 
responsibility is a device of declaratory normative effect, yet it often 
provides no satisfactory risk-shifting and cost-allocation strategy portfolio 
for countries to rely upon.  Damnum infectum est damnum nondum factum, 
quod futurum veremur.147  Redress should compensate for both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary losses, whenever applicable.  Time-wise, it might either 
account for the passing of time (beyond the elementary restoration of the 
status quo ante, provided that restoration is even achievable), or result from 
less expensive cost-effectiveness calculations when the worth of the 
damaged heritage would not significantly exceed the costs for its 
restoration.  Furthermore, reparation should take into account social costs 
(such as community dispersion, cultural displacement, group identity 
alienation), to be identified against the backdrop of wider implications for 
indigenous communities’ livelihood as well as their coping and adaptation 
capabilities (drawing on the language of the Paris Agreement).  Additional 
cost items may originate in the touristic value of the damaged site/tradition 
(for instance, as a share of the annual average of the local GDP), in other 
developmental considerations, and in the economic equivalence of the 
future potential legitimate exploitation of said site/tradition that the 
population concerned would have put in place would the damage not have 
been perpetrated. 
 
146. Michael Pollitt, Green Values in Communities: How and Why to Engage 
Individuals with Decarbonization Targets, GREEN BUSINESS, GREEN VALUES, AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 67, 77 (Christos N. Pitelis et al. eds., 2011). 
147. Nuclear Test (Australia v. France), Judgment, 1974, I.C.J. 389 (Dec. 20, 1975) 
(de Castro, J., dissenting). 
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The rationales supporting the case for liability application might vary 
widely:148 liability can function as an economic incentive for compliance 
with environmental obligations; as a sanction regime for damaging—yet 
not internationally wrongful—conduct; as a corrective mechanism to 
restore environmental assets to their previous conditions; and as a 
Pigouvian strategy against the externalisation of a State’s hazardous 
environmental choices.  Specularly, it could work for internalising 
environmental, social, and insurance costs into production processes, this 
way implementing the polluter-pays principle (a flagship norm for the EU) 
and functioning as a post-damage or parametric risk-pooling factor.149  But 
it is not only a strictly legal matter: framing cultural heritage claims against 
liability schemes employed in environmental affairs allows one to grasp the 
underlying goals of rhetorical devices used in politics across multiple 
fields.  Curiously, not even the crafting of soft norms such as the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration150 was deemed appropriate a mechanism for 
reaching consensus over detailed liability rules, implying they would be 
better left to case-by-case political adjustment between the parties.151  
Moreover, the same Declaration does not expressively refer to either 
natural or cultural heritage: only the former was indirectly referred to in 
Principle 4, satisfying a request advanced by the Indian delegates.152  
 
III.1  Forms of liability and related terminological uncertainties 
 
Two inextricable elements constitute the cause of action of 
State liability: the objective element materialized through the 
violation of an international rule (the wrongful act), and the 
subjective element, made of the linkage which relies this wrongful 
act to its author State (the causal link).  The objective element 
 
 148. See also UNGA, Report of the UN Secretary-General on the “Gaps in 
international environmental law and environment-related instruments: Towards a global 
pact for the environment,” UN Doc. A/73/419 (Nov. 30, 2018) ¶ 94. 
149. See Morten Broberg, Parametric loss and damage insurance schemes as a 
means to enhance climate change resilience in developing countries, 20 CLIM. POL. 693, 
694–696 (2020) (explaining the difference between parametric and post-damage risk-
pooling insurance criteria). 
150. See Günther Handl, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 1992, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International 
Law (2012), https://perma.cc/47A5-BE8U (succinct expert commentary). 
151. BHARAT H. DESAI, MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL 
STATUS OF THE SECRETARIATS 28–29 (2010). 
152. Catherine Redgwell, The International Law of Public Participation: Protected 
Areas, Endangered Species, and Biological Diversity, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 187, 191 n.18. (Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas, 
George Pring eds., 2002). 
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consists thus of the violation of an international rule.  However, in 
certain hypotheses, States can bear responsibility for injurious 
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international 
law; this phenomenon is commonly called liability without fault, 
for risk or objective liability.  Such regimes are well known in 
domestic law, but the international sphere remains almost 
unaffected by them.  The works of the International Law 
Commission have not been conclusive on this point.  There is no 
principle in international customary law on such an objective State 
liability, including for environmental damages.  There is only one 
Convention that provides for such a regime of objective 
international liability, namely the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.  To allow better 
reparation of environmental damages, around fifteen international 
conventions have developed regimes of objective liability but by 
shifting the responsibility on operators (managers and owners), 
thus drifting from public to private international law.153 
 
In sum, the forms in which liability presents itself are: state liability 
only; civil liability with residual state liability; and civil liability only.  The 
first can be further divided in three categories: subjective, objective (or 
strict), and absolute liability.  The first category concerns acts performed 
by the State, of which the latter is intentionally responsible, and it stands as 
a corollary of international responsibility; the second refers to acts 
performed by the State unwillingly, e.g., by being negligent; the third 
proceeds so far as to cover acts not performed directly by the States and yet 
occurred resulting in damages vis-à-vis third parties, where it was not 
explicitly obvious the State should have exercised appreciable degrees of 
oversight. 
However, there is no perfect alignment in academic literature on these 
sorting criteria.  Admittedly, there are several scholarly traditions whose 
views on this issue diverge both conceptually and linguistically: liability is 
first a device of domestic (administrative and private) law, which is later 
“stretched” to acquire international applicability, and this enucleates the 
divergence between scholars on both substance and terminology.  The just-
mentioned three typologies of liability have been rephrased in literature, for 
example, as follows: 
 
fault (negligence), strict liability (there is a presumption of 
responsibility but defenses are available), and absolute liability 
(no cause of justification is possible, and a [S]tate would be liable 
even for an act of God).  While fault is based on due diligence, 
 
153. Maljean-Dubois, supra note 108, at 32–33. 
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strict and absolute liability impose responsibility for acts not 
prohibited under international law.  Strict liability emphasizes the 
harm rather than the conduct.  It is a widespread opinion that 
international law lacks absolute or strict liability as a general rule. 
[…]  For example, strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities can 
be considered a general principle of law since it is found in 
municipal legislation worldwide.  Some treaties even support 
absolute liability for these activities.  However, strict or absolute 
liability is more difficult to impute for activities that are not 
ultrahazardous. 154  
 
One further way to interpret state liabilities is that none involves fault; 
as per this view, both strict and absolute liability are objective liabilities 
insofar as subjective ones are only arguable in international criminal law as 
far as individuals (heads of State, ministers, plus other public officials) are 
concerned. Under this interpretation, too, looking at environmental law is 
the wiser option to seek compensation for damages to cultural heritage, as 
domestic experiences like the Brazilian one started to demonstrate.155 
Another issue is that, not rarely, “liable” and “responsible” are even 
used interchangeably,156 whereas instead international liability and 
international responsibility are truly different concepts.157  The latter is 
triggered by a state breach of a primary rule jointly with the attribution of 
such a breach; the second entails either a monetary redress following 
responsibility (absolute liability) or a payment ex gratia for non-wrongful 
yet attributed or attributable acts (strict liability).  There exists a further 
distinction between direct and vicarious responsibility, which comes into 
play when private actors’ violations are culpably not prevented by the State, 
which only bears relevance domestically.  For example, with reference to 
the US, a study concluded that regarding 
the question of whether environmental liability should be 
deterred through a negligence or a strict liability rule, […] the 
policy maker should […] introduce strict liability for 
environmental pollution, [provided] that if a serious insolvency 
risk exists, the introduction of strict liability [is] accompanied with 
 
154. Max Valverde Soto, General Principles of International Environmental Law, 3 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193, 203 (1996) (emphasis added). 
155. Ana Maria Moreira Marchesan, A Tutela Do Patrimônio Cultural Sob O 
Enfoque Do Direito Ambiental: Uma Abordagem Transdisciplinar 277–78 (2006) 
(unpublished LLM Thesis, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina). 
156. E.g., Morten Broberg, Interpreting the UNFCCC’s provisions on “mitigation” 
and “adaptation” in light of the Paris Agreement’s provision on “loss and damage,” 20 
CLIM. POL. 527, 529 (2020). 
157. See generally N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Responsibility and 
International Liability, 4 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 47 (1991). 
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solvency guarantees, such as the introduction of compulsory 
insurance.  Otherwise, strict liability may exactly have the effect 
of driving polluters to reduce the assets that are exposed to 
liability.158 
 
All in all, primary rules at the international level should always spell 
out clearly what the expectations are in terms of state duties to prevent, as 
well as the demarcation between obligations of conduct and of result, as to 
avoid confusion and unevenness of claims between international lawyers 
and practitioners from different jurisdictions.  Terminological uncertainties 
go the extra mile also with regards to the classes of remedies159 resulting 
from different unlawful or otherwise illicit behaviour.160  At any rate, this 
article concerns itself with explaining why cultural heritage should be 
protected in combination with the environment, why state liability is a 
necessary device to uphold such protection, and why China is a central 
actor to watch in order to track and retrace the trends in this respect.  A 
thorough systematisation of this confusion on questions of classes and 
theories in liability regimes falls outside the aspirations of the present study. 
Claims of state liability can be submitted before national courts and 
tribunals, before international courts and tribunals,161 or directly to relevant 
state officials for political resolution.  These claims can be thus settled 
diplomatically (through mediation and negotiation) or judicially (through 
litigation and arbitration),162 with mixed results in terms of normative 
impact on the future conduct of States.  As for China, it “has more than 
sixty environmental chambers in fourteen courts in Provinces, for hearing 
 
158. Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence 
Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 303–304 (2012) (emphasis added). 
159. For example: reparation, compensation, restoration, retribution, redress, 
recovery, injunctive relief, remedy, penalty, fine, indemnification. 
160. For example: nuisance, damage, injury, destruction, harm, mistreatment, tort, 
fault, crime. 
161. Nevertheless, potential criminal options (which would support e.g., evidence 
gathering) against top officials are not available, as the ICC non-parties are the very same 
top polluters (China and the US in the first place).  On the (propounded, but apparently later 
aborted) “environmental turn” of the ICC, see Olesya Dovgalyuk & Riccardo Vecellio 
Segate, From Russia and beyond: The ICC global standing, while countries’ resignation is 
getting serious, FiloDiritto, 18 (2017), https://perma.cc/J9EX-HDS3. 
162. Refer e.g., to the 2001 PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating 
to the Environment and/or Natural Resources, under which individuals and other non-state 
entities may file a claim concerning other States’ violation of environmental and natural 
resources. Still, this does not fill the gap about the actio popularis which could trigger 
proceedings regarding global (rather than transnational) environmental claims.  Famous 
arbitration cases which shaped the course of international environmental law are Trail 
Smelter (United States v Canada), 3 U.N. Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938 
and 1941); and Lac Lanoux (France v Spain), 12 U.N. Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards (1957). 
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citizen complaints against polluters;”163 pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the Chinese 
public administration can be sued, too,164 which is a strong signal of 
authoritarianisation of state power rather than of its weakening.165  Subject 
to an anything-but-obvious state consent, relying on domestic courts for the 
enforcement of state liability clauses (and transboundary environmental 
law more generally) bears one obvious advantage and one equally obvious 
disadvantage: the chance to ensure the bindingness of the judgements, and 
the risk of further fragmenting a fast-paced legal field which is already 
moving in uncoordinated directions.166 
Furthermore, a distinction shall be operated between issues of climate 
change and transboundary pollution.  Assuming the existence of States A 
to G, four typologies of cases are foreseeable: transboundary (damage to 
e.g., A and B, with A or B starting it by damaging themselves first), 
international unilateral (damage e.g., from A to B), international bilateral 
(mutual damage between A and B and vice versa), international multilateral 
(damage e.g., from A to BCDE or from ABC to DEFG or from ABCDE to 
G etc.—some multilateral configurations can actually be read as bilateral 
instead, for instance when the European Union as a whole is involved), or 
global (when all States—or most of them—threaten a “commons” in a 
supranational fashion that makes it unfeasible or blatantly unfair to 
apportion faults).  In each of these cases, the parties have to identify the 
(most) competent forum, the source of the applicable liability rules,167 and 








163. Nicholas A. Robinson,  Evolved norms: A canon for the Anthropocene,  RULE 
OF LAW FOR NATURE: NEW DIMENSIONS AND IDEAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 46, 70 (Christina 
Voigt, ed. 2013); see also Minchum Zhang and Bao Zhang, Specialized Environmental 
Courts in China: Status Quo, Challenges and Responses, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES  
L. 361 (2012); Rachel E. Stern, The Political Logic of China’s New Environmental Courts, 
72 THE CHINA J. 53 (2014). 
164. Taisu Zhang & Thomas B. Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 VA. J. INT'L 
L., 280, 310 n.144 (2019). 
165. RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE, 100–104 (2013). 
166. TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 78–80 
(2009). 
167. General principles of transboundary liability in environmental matters; 
customary laws; treaties, possibly supplemented by and “operated” through soft norms; 
domestic civil law (of which side?); domestic criminal law (of which side?). 
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III.2  Liability schemes and environmental principles 
 
Whatever the forum and framework for submission, the elements of 
liability which are often argued about in terms of environmental damage168 
(especially to cultural heritage) are linked to a variety of principles, 
standards, and customary expectations.  Some of the most cited are the 
polluter-pays principle, the “solidarity” principle, the right to a clean and 
healthy environment (quality living), the no-harm principle (substantially 
equivalent to the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas one), and the 
“intergenerational equity” principle within the paradigms of 
sustainability.169  Whereas some of these principles, functionally employed 
as interstitial norms,170 may play a clearer role in shaping judicial responses 
to transboundary harm, their applicability to climate-change submissions is 
still controversial in both civil- and common-law systems.171 
The “common but differentiated responsibility” principle172 holds a 
position of prominence for discussions over liability regimes in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction(s) or with reference to the global commons,173 
for instance regarding climate change: 
 
The proposition that large emitters in the developing world 
(such as China, India and Brazil) should accept mandatory 
emission reduction targets has revitalized questions of North-
South equity and the industrialized countries’ historical 
responsibility for the build-up of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations. [. . .]  Proposals for more systematic 
differentiation on the basis of historic responsibility for elevated 
atmospheric GHG concentrations, financial capability to pay for 
mitigation measures, intra-national equity among rich and poor 
 
168.See TRAINING MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 50–64 (Lal 
Kurukulasuriya & Nicholas A. Robinson eds., 2006) (general introduction to state liability 
schemes in IEL). 
169.  Their most thorough examination is probably accomplished in PHILIPPE SANDS 
& JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (4th ed. 2018).  
 170. On environmental principles as interstitial norms, see, most recently, Guillaume 
Futhazar, The Normative Nature of the Ecosystem Approach: A Mediterranean Case Study, 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 11–13 (2020). 
171. See generally Daniel G. Hare, Blue Jeans, Chewing Gum and Climate Change 
Litigation: American Exports to Europe, 29 UTRECHT J. INT. EUR. LAW 65 (2013). 
172. See HARRIET BULKELEY AND PETER NEWELL, GOVERNING CLIMATE CHANGE 30 
(2010). 
173. The discourse on the “commons” is channelled through uneven narratives, 
depending on the subject-matters (i.e., the “commons” among cultural heritage expressions, 
those among natural environments, etc.). 
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social groups, and differentiation between luxury and survival 
emissions have therefore surfaced in the debate.174 
 
Whilst the Kyoto approach to this principle distinguished the 
responsibilities of the industrialised nations from “the rest,”175 the Paris 
Agreement “took a decisive turn away from cross-cutting prescriptive 
differentiation towards tailored differentiation,” with different issue-areas 
reflecting disparate differentiation criteria (financial capability, 
developmental classification, contribution to emissions) as a result of 
impervious bargaining between the US and China.176 
Another core principle is the precautionary one, references thereto 
having been invariably made 
 
(i) to caution against the principle’s “potentially paralysing 
effects;” (ii) to assess whether certain measures expressly adopted 
on the basis of the precautionary principle are indeed justified 
under this principle; (iii) as a stand-alone norm relevant to produce 
procedural effects (the reversal of the burden of proof); (iv) as a 
stand-alone norm relevant to for the interpretation of an 
environmental provision governing a case; (v) as a stand-alone 
norm for reviewing of government action; (vi) as a stand-alone 
norm creating a positive procedural obligation; (vii) as a stand-
alone norm redefining the parameters of liability (effectively 
transforming a fault-based liability system into a strict liability 
one); and (viii) as a stand-alone norm requiring the creation of a 
new administrative system.177 
 
Other Authors in fact claim that the difference between the 
precautionary principle and the polluter-pays one is that the first is 
procedural and the second substantive, concerned with burden of proof and 
apportionment of costs respectively, although both oriented to the 
 
174. Karin Bäckstrand & Eva Lövbrand, Climate Governance Beyond 2012: 
Competing Discourses of Green Governmentality, Ecological Modernization and Civic 
Environmentalism, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: POWER, KNOWLEDGE, 
NORMS, DISCOURSES 123, 137 (Mary E. Pettenger ed., 2007). 
175. Kiyotake Morita, Policies Towards Tackling Climate Change and Their 
Compatibility with the WTO, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE EU AND 
JAPAN 63, 78 (Yumiko Nakanishi ed., 2016); Anne-Sophie Tabau, Climate Change 
Compliance Procedures, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL 
LAW [MPEiPro] § 6 (2019). 
176. Lavanya Rajamani, Differentiation, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 167, 170–173 (Aguila, Yann, and Jorge Enrique Viñuales eds., 2019). 
177. Aguila, supra note 144, at 18–19 (emphasis added); see also Robyn Eckersley, 
Environment rights and democracy, POLITICAL ECOLOGY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL 347, 362 
(Roger H. Keil et al. eds., 1998). 
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internalisation of environmental costs in industrial production and 
commercial choices made by consumers (especially in the Global North).178 
Finally, the debate is open as to whether customary obligations to 
prevent exist, either under inter-state rules or with regards to the global 
commons.  One should notice that redressable environmental harms might 
be constituted by single acts of pollution or by multiple yet localised acts 
of degradation (slow-onset harm); either way, they shall be underpinned by 
certainty of relatability (causation).  Conversely, probability (correlation) 
is what describes the negative effects of climate change as a general 
phenomenon in the more abstract and gradual sense.  Depending on the 
field, the signatories, and the region (when such arrangements are regional), 
liability schemes may prescribe a range of duties.179 
 
III.3    Liability schemes in the legal governance of the environment 
 
Article 8 of the [Paris] Agreement does not involve or provide a basis 
for any liability or compensation.180 
Focusing on perfecting and diversifying liability arrangements 
displaces a large part of the inadequacy that the concept of “responsibility” 
faces in improving the global governance of the environment.181  Some 
Authors posit that out of countless quasi-principles permeating IEL, that of 
 
178. BURNS H. WESTON & DAVID BOLLIER, GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL 
SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS 191 (2013).  However, the ICJ 
did not endorse the equation of this principle with a reversal of the burden. See Ginevra Le 
Molli et al., Whither the Proof? The Progressive Reversal of the Burden of Proof in 
Environmental Cases before International Courts and Tribunals, 8 J.I.D.S. 644 (2017). 
179. Just to exemplify, provided the proven concretisation of an actual damage, 
liability may be incurred into for the unfulfillment of different sets of actions, ranging from 
cooperation in scientific research, prior notice, stakeholders consultation, information 
exchange, reporting, impact assessment, administrative oversight, relevant legislation etc. 
to the duties of preventing, compliance monitoring, recording, containing, performing (or at 
least funding) cleaning-up activities, assisting in the re-adaptation and elaboration of 
copying strategies, etc., or again, even ex post, for failing to investigate and thus to “lesson 
learn.”  Several jurisdictions demand the execution of environmental and archaeological 
feasibility studies and expert evaluations at the same time, grounded on the precautionary 
principle; a few countries also show an approach to international investment law warranting 
the inclusion in their BITs of a clause calling for special care when it comes to investments 
potentially impacting sites of tangible or intangible cultural significance (see, e.g., 
Art.200(3) of the 2008 China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement).  Preventive actions on 
long-term pollution (low intensity) or the drawing of contingency plans for possibly 
impending disasters (high intensity) may be required, along with the establishment of 
financial compensatory plans at the governmental level, whilst leaving States to deal with 
their own private entities subsequently (burden shifting).  
180. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), at ¶ 52. 
 181. See generally Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: 
Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2001). 
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liability for damage is an unconfutable one, endowed with the status of 
customary law;182 consequently, it seems a solid terrain to assess the “state 
of the art” in environmental protection in a given country, as well as the 
way the environmental protection implemented by said country might 
positively spill-over onto another legal protection: that to cultural heritage.  
The Stockholm Declaration encouraged States to formulate their own 
liability rules for transboundary damage,183 yet 
 
[r]elevant issues not addressed include the type and degree 
of environmental harm to be prevented, the procedural obligations 
(such as notification, consultation, and cooperation) that are 
necessary to ensure that harm does not occur or is minimised, and 
whether the obligation of prevention is one of strict liability or due 
diligence, and the relevant remedies applicable in the event of any 
breach.184 
 
Conversely, UN-sponsored Guidelines for the development of 
national legislation on liability, response action and compensation for 
damage caused by activities dangerous to the environment185—adopted by 
UNEP’s Governing Council at its 11th Special Session in Bali together with 
its Guidelines for the development of national legislation on access to 
information, public participation and access to justice in environmental 
matters—are so detailed that, although non-binding like the Stockholm 
Declaration, leave far less leeway to States not only in legislating on the 
matter, but in deciding how such legislation should be worded and what 
exceptions it should provide for.  On top of that, fundamental scholarly 
views include the Resolution “Responsibility and Liability under 
International Law for Environmental Damage” released by the Institute of 
International Law in 1997, the Principles on Climate Change and Climate 
Liability Under Public International Law developed by the International 
Law Association in 2014 and, most authoritatively, the 2001 Draft of 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities adopted by 
the International Law Commission (“ILC”).186  The same ILC, in its Draft 
 
182. E.g., Winfried Lang, UN Principles and International Environmental Law, 3 
MAX PLANCK YRBK. U. N. L. 157, 165–166 (1999). 
183. See Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc.A/CONF.48/14, at principles 21–
22 (1972). 
184. STEPHENS, supra note 166, at 153. 
185. UNEP/GCSS.XI/L.5 (2010). 
186. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 
in Report of the International Law Commission, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).  See e.g., Arts. 3, 8 and related 
Commentaries (e.g., Commentary 10 to Art. 3, on due diligence).  Those two articles build 
on Principles 13, 18 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
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Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities (2006 second reading), has included 
cultural heritage in the scope of property187 (even if the Draft’s scope 
deliberately excluded economic and financial harms related to 
environmental ones in the aftermath of transboundary pollution188).  
Somewhat similarly, even the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection 
to the Antarctic Treaty—also called “Antarctic-Environmental Protocol,” 
or “Madrid Protocol”—mentioned the “degradation of, or substantial risk 
to, areas of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness 
significance“189 before calling for the specification of liabilities for 
damage.190  The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (“CRAMRA”) had only referred to the obligation of 
taking into account “the preservation of historic monuments”191 before 
deciding on new Antarctic mineral resource expeditions. 
Further significant efforts have been deployed by regional UN bodies; 
for instance, the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention, already 
mentioned supra, 
 
is part of a pan-European legal framework to protect our 
environment and encourage sustainable development that has 
been negotiated by governments within the UN/ECE in response 
to regional challenges. Apart from this Convention, the 
framework also consists of four other multilateral agreements: 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and its 
 
187. Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm 
arising out of hazardous activities in Report of the International Law Commission, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10). 
Principle 2(a)(ii); see also Principles 4, 7. 
188. See HANQIN XUE, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1st ed. 
2003).  Whilst the Author was later elected as a Member of the International Law 
Commission and as a Judge and Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, this 
monograph is an expanded version of her SJD Thesis at Columbia University Law School 
under the supervision of Professor Oscar Schachter, thus its contents might not perfectly 
align with her later official views on these dossiers.  Moreover, the fact that at the time of 
publication she was already serving as the Director-General of the Law and Treaty 
Department of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps explain the virtual absence of 
references to Chinese law and its international implications, which is truly unfortunate and 
quite a severe gap in her study. 
189. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 
I.L.M. 1455, 1462. Art. 3(2)(b)(vi) (emphasis added). 
190. Annex VI on Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies to the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 16 (June 14, 2005). 
191. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities art. XV 
(1), June 2, 1988. 
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eight Protocols;192 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and its 
Protocol on Water and Health; Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; and Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.193 
 
As for the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on Environment and Human Rights, 
released on 7 February 2018, is the reference authority on transboundary 
environmental damage.194  Given that similar human rights arrangements 
do not feature in the Asian regionalism and international human rights law 
is factually unserviceable in Chinese courts, no comparable judgement 
bears any relevance for China.  The non-binding 2007 Singapore 
Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment adopted by 
ASEAN members along with Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea 
and New Zealand limits itself to formulaic expressions with no mention of 
either cultural heritage or liabilities, whilst confirming in passing “support 
for UNFCCC work [. . .] including through appropriate international 
incentives and assistance.”195 
As for international judicial pronouncements, pre-eminence shall be 
accorded to notable International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) case-law196 
which, having been already explored in-depth in legal scholarship, will not 
be examined in detail here. 
 
192. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (“UNECE”), 
CONVENTION ON THE TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS (2015).  See 
“Considering . . . ” in the Preamble. 
193. From its description on UNECE’s official website, at https://perma.cc/FWX9-
5UAR. [footnotes added] 
194. Out of a vast literature on this much-awaited IACtHR Opinion, see Monica 
Feria-Tinta & Simon C. Milnes, The Rise of Environmental Law in International Dispute 
Resolution: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Issues a Landmark Advisory 
Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, 27 Y.B. OF INT’L ENVTL L. 64 (2016); 
Giovanny Vega-Barbosa & Lorraine Aboagye, Human Rights and the Protection of the 
Environment: The Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, EJIL: 
TALK! (Feb. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/SYW8-GQ84. 
195. Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, Nov. 
21, 2007, art. 9(d) (emphasis added). 
196. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 241; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
People's Republic of Albania, Judgment, 1940 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949)); Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungry v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 38 (Sept. 25, 1997) (Weeramantry, 
J.); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. ¶ 122 (Apr. 20, 
2010) (Cançado Trindade, J.); Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand 
intervening), 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 47 (Feb. 6, 2014) (Cançado Trindade, J.). 
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On another note, private liability schemes are widespread.197  The 
1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting 
from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
does not mention damage to cultural property/heritage, consistently with 
all others which focus on the natural consequences of environmental 
hazards.  Among them, we shall mention at least the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the 1992 Protocol 
which created the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, the 1971 International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, the 2000 Protocol leading to the 
FUND Convention, the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, and the 2010 
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  In civil liability schemes 
concerning the environment, strict liability is the norm, and absolute 
liability its exception.198  Most are yet to enter into force, and it is far from 
clear whether they establish any individual civil liability directly under 
international law, instead of the more “classical” state liability for failing 
to enforce liability schemes bearing on non-state actors within signatories’ 
domestic jurisdiction.199 
In the ship-owning market, under the CLC/FUND, HNSC, and 
Bunkers Convention regimes, a strict liability model in which 
compensation claims are shifted against the insurer benefitted both the 
victims (certainty of redress) and the polluters (no delays due to arrest and 
inspection by coastal States, and no litigation on faults as cases can be 
settled amicably).200 
 
IV.  Why is China important? 
 
[T]o the extent that China has thrived, it has been by defying 
many elements of the neo-liberal model.  Leave out China, and the 
 
197. For a concise commented overview, see Andrea Laura Mackielo, Core Rules of 
International Environmental Law, 16 ILSA J. of INT’L and COMP. L. 259, 271–73 (2009). 
198. Philippe Cullet, Liability and redress for human-induced global warming: 
Towards an international regime, 43 STAN. J. of INT’L L. 99, 111–12 (2007). 
199. Vincent-Joël Proulx, International Civil Individual Responsibility and the 
Security Council: Building the Foundations of a General Regime, 40 MICH. J. of INT’L L. 
215, 230–31 (2019). 
200. ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 342–43 (2005). 
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story of the rest of the world is sluggish growth in the North, 
erratic growth in the South and rising inequality everywhere.201 
 
IV.1  Seeking coherence and prospect in China’s “exceptionalism” 
 
Since July 2019, at pair with Italy, China registers the highest number 
(fifty-five) of UNESCO-protected sites inscribed in the World Heritage 
List, and due to China’s size (and civilisational history), not to mention its 
unyielding “soft”-power within UNESCO,202 it is going to outpace the 
Italian “competitor” soon. Some of the most well-preserved sites globe-
wide combining nature with heritage are in China;203 for instance, the 
founding director of the United Nations University Institute for Integrated 
Management of Material Fluxes and of Resources cites the case of 
Hángzhōu [杭州], in the Zhèjiāng province [浙江省], hosting the “West 
Lake Cultural Landscape [. . . ,] where natural elements, farmed landscape 
and artificial elements manifest a perfect fusion.”204  Populations’ 
relationship with natural and cultural heritage in rural areas represents a 
story of fragile yet almost uninterrupted symbiosis: almost 78% of China’s 
protected areas are located in the country’s western provinces of Xīzàng, 
Xīnjiāng, and Sìchuān,205 way poorer compared to the sparkling of those 
coastal cities (like Shànghǎi) China is most known for today beyond its 
borders. 
 
201. KEVIN P. GALLAGHER and RICHARD KOZUL-WRIGHT, A NEW 
MULTILATERALISM: GENEVA PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL FOR SHARED 
PROSPERITY 19 (Global Development Policy Center, 2019). 
 202. See Enrico Bertacchini, Claudia Liuzza & Lynn Meskell, Shifting the balance 
of power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: An empirical assessment, 23(3) INT’L 
J. OF CULTURAL POL’Y 331, 334, 345 (2017). 
 203. This article focuses on the so-called “Mainland China,” which coincides with 
the internationally recognized territory of the People’s Republic of China except for its two 
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong (“HKSAR”) and Macao (“MSAR”).  This 
notwithstanding, HKSAR and MSAR, together with a number of cities surrounding the 
Pearl River Delta in the Mainland’s Guangdong Province, represent an increasingly cardinal 
economic powerhouse known as the Greater Bay Area (“GBA”), which comes to be of 
outstanding preciousness (and precarity) artistically and environmentally as well.  The 
linkage between cultural heritage and the environment in the GBA is illustrated in Rostam 
Josef Neuwirth & Zhijie Chen, The Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area: 
Cultural Heritage Laws as a Bridge between Past and Future, 50(2) HONG KONG L.J. 743–
779 (2020) (see particularly p. 765, about Annex 10 to the Technical Memoranda on Hong 
Kong’s Environmental Impact Assessment Process). 
204.  Retrievable from Reza Ardakanian & Stephan Hülsmann, Impact of Global 
Change on World Heritage and on Environmental Resources: The Need for an Integrated 
Management Approach, CLIMATE CHANGE AS A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL 
HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 101, 103 (Sabine von Schorlemer & Sylvia Maus eds., 
2014) (emphasis added). 
205. Miao He & An Cliquet, Sustainable development through a rights-based 
approach to conserve protected areas in China, 3 CHINA-EU L.J. 143, 144 (2014). 
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Beginning with the First Opium War in the 1840s through the WW2, 
Europeans contributed to a barbarian negation of China’s civilised and 
civilisational roots by destroying or looting most of its heritage, in what is 
known as the “Century of Humiliation” (Bǎinián Guóchǐ, 百年国耻).206  
Today, China prides itself on its millennia-long civilisation, yet it has never 
been able or willing to comprehensively adopt a management plan for its 
cultural heritage as to preserve what remains of its vestiges to the benefit 
of the upcoming generations.207  To the contrary, few movements in human 
history have attacked their own cultural heritage—both tangible and 
intangible, movable and immovable—as mercilessly as the fanatics of the 
Cultural Revolution—Chinese themselves—did: “the Cultural 
Revolutionary campaign of “destroying the Four Olds” (pòsìjiù, 破四旧) 
meant attacking old ideas, old habits, old customs, and old culture.”208  The 
exaltation of human labour entailed no machines (differently from the 
Soviets), crude rejection of intellectuals, no lawyers, people-to-people 
diplomacy, in an “it’s all about mobilising labour”-fashion; the fact that this 
triggered widespread destruction of cultural heritage speaks volumes about 
the latter’s ideal identification as a product of the intellect rather than of 
manual labour, otherwise, it would have perhaps been saved.  Nonetheless, 
when judged from an environmental prism, the country did come a long 
way from the barbarism of the “Cultural” Revolution to reasonably genuine 
environmental commitments bearing indirect but positive effects on 
cultural heritage protection.  As such, China testifies to the importance of 
this linkage at its best.  For example, under the 2007-revised Cultural Relics 
Protection Law [guójiā wénwù bǎohùfǎ, 国家文物保护法], Chinese 
“[e]nvironmental agencies may punish violations […] involving pollution 
levels at protected sites,”209 although enforcement efforts still languish. 
China’s environmental law, extremely advanced and rich on paper—
 
206. See ERIK RINGMAR, LIBERAL BARBARISM: THE EUROPEAN DESTRUCTION OF THE 
PALACE OF THE EMPEROR OF CHINA (2013); DAVID SCOTT, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM, 1840–1949: POWER, PRESENCE, AND PERCEPTIONS IN A CENTURY OF HUMILIATION, 
41, 260 (2008); HUI ZHONG, CHINA, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2–3 
(2018). 
207. Yunxia Wang, Enforcing Import Restrictions of China’s Cultural Objects: The 
Sino-US Memorandum of Understanding, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL 
HERITAGE LAW 240, 241 (Tami Blumenfield and Helaine Silverman eds., 2013). 
208. Curtis Ashton, Beijing’s Museums in the Context of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
CULTURAL HERITAGE POLITICS IN CHINA 187, 190 n.1 (Tami Blumenfield & Helaine 
Silverman eds., 2013). 
209. Phillip Newell, The PRC’s Law for the Protection of Cultural Relics, 13 ART 
ANTIQUITY & L. 1, 53 (2008).  This was confirmed in art. 67 of the 2017 revision, according 
to which Chinese environmental agencies may punish violations involving polluting 
facilities at protected sites. 
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starting with Article 26 of the 1982 Constitution—is in fact infamous for 
the incompliance thereof, especially in the most decentralised provinces.210 
Environment-wise, “China’s participation in international 
environmental conferences and conventions on biodiversity preservation 
followed upon [its] opening up to global forces after the Maoist era, and 
expressed the increased value [it] placed in the UN and international 
law.”211  At present, China shows the contradiction of representing the 
world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and a firmly committed 
environmentalist power at once, with new renewable-energy projects 
realised every day (including the production of electric cars) and local draft 
regulations on mandatory emission trading systems.  “[A]ny success of 
reduction in those developed [S]tates having fulfilled their obligations in 
respect to reduction to climate change (like [in] the EU), are more than 
compensated simply by the increase of emissions of fast developing 
countries.  China is meanwhile the world’s biggest emitter; [however, this] 
may be explained by the large population” rather than dismissal of genuine 
environmental public-policy concerns,212 as China scores low per-capita 
emission levels.  If a couple of decades ago only foreign firms operating in 
China possessed the technology needed to build coal-efficient power plants, 
yet this economic-ecological gain was frequently annulled by high 
transaction costs due to difficulties in copying with unfriendly 
governmental bureaucratic procedures,213 today Chinese firms own similar 
and more advance technologies that can lead environmental progress from 
within (and even export it regionally).  As for the emission trading systems, 
China does not host an international one214—which would be a worthwhile 
policy action to pursue, since “the problem of sharing the burden equitably 
 
210. See generally Wanxin Li [李万新], Environmental Governance: Issues and 
Challenges, 36 ENVTL L. REP. 10506, 10515–10525 (2006). 
211. GERALD A. MCBEATH & LENG TSE-KANG, GOVERNANCE OF BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN 75 (2006).  As for biodiversity specifically, China is 
a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992; 1760 U.N.T.S. 69) and will 
host the Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to said Convention in Kunming 
from 17–30 May 2021.  By contrast, it has (temporarily?) not undersigned the Leaders’ 
Pledge for Nature (text available at https://perma.cc/K7J9-PXSR) developed by the Alliance 
of Small Island States to reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.  See Lisa M. Cox, Australia joins 
US, China and Russia in refusing to sign leaders' pledge on biodiversity, GUARDIAN (2020), 
https://perma.cc/T83W-E86P. 
212. Simon Spyra & Eike Albrecht, Beside Adaptation: Concepts for the Future, 
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTATION STRATEGIES BY LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PLANNING 
INSTRUMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 329, 334–37 (Eike Albrecht et al. eds., 2014). 
213. Thomas Charles Heller, Additionality, Transactional Barriers and the Political 
Economy of Climate Change, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 203, 219–220 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999). 
214. VEERLE VANDEWEERD, CITIES AND LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 36–
7 (China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, 2014).  
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is significantly less difficult if emission rights are tradeable”215—but 
recently implemented a nationwide system,216 which have attracted 
curiosity and political praise217 but also informed criticisms and scepticism 
from the scientific community.218  However, the general attitude of the 
Chinese government stands out of the general wisdom that “scientific 
evidence tends to be deconstructed to the extent that it threatens powerful 
political and economic interests,” even more remarkably insofar as 
“authoritarian regimes as a whole tend to sacrifice the environment in favor 
of other concerns.”219  Obviously, in any case, a country cannot be 
measured against its commitments but against its actions, which means that 
if the latter do not suffice, the legal framework should accompany—and 
possibly compel—higher effectiveness accordingly. 
China’s fierce battle against ozone depletion is exemplificatory in that 
it shows that despite implementation difficulties, Beijing honoured its 
commitments under the 1987 Montreal Protocol,220 motivated by appraisals 
on international reputation but also encouraged by a Multilateral Fund 
established by developed countries.221  In this case, the Fund follows a 
different rationale compared to similar economic arrangements in 
environmental treaties: its money is provided by the industrialised nations 
through expert organisations (UNEP, UNDP, World Bank, regional 
 
215. Glenn W. Harrison & Thomas F. Rutherford, Burden Sharing, Joint 
Implementation, and Carbon Coalitions, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 77, 77 (Carlo Carraro ed., 1999). 
216. Covering “eight energy-intensive sectors, namely petrochemical, chemical, 
building materials, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, papermaking, power generation and 
aviation industries, [t]he national ETS targets more than 7,000 industrial companies and 
aircraft operators whose annual energy consumption is more than 10,000 tons of standard 
coal in any year during 2013-2015 [ . . . ].  It covers about 5 billion tons of CO2 or half of 
national overall emissions, leading China to become the biggest carbon market in the 
world.”  ZHEN JIN & ERI IKEDA, THE LATEST PROGRESS OF EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES IN 
JAPAN, CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 7 (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 
2017), https://perma.cc/X4TK-CSKE. 
217. See, e.g., the proposals advanced in Melinda Melvin, China’s Emissions 
Trading System: Steps toward article 6 linkage, 31 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., 197, 197–
223 (2019). 
218. On the most recent developments see Jennifer Morris et al., Impacts of China’s 
emissions trading schemes on deployment of power generation with carbon capture and 
storage, 81 ENERGY ECON., 848 (2019); Mao-Zhi Deng & Wen-Xiu Zhang, Recognition and 
analysis of potential risks in China’s carbon emission trading markets, 10 ADVANCES IN 
CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 30 (2019). 
219. Myanna Lahsen, Trust Through Participation? Problems of Knowledge in 
Climate Decision Making, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: POWER, 
KNOWLEDGE, NORMS, DISCOURSES 173, 186 (Mary E. Pettenger ed., 2007). 
220. Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The Chinese Government’s Role in 
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol, 
175 CHINA Q. 708, 710 (2003). 
221. Id. at 714–15. 
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banks)222 and allocated to the developing ones for the latter to reach the 
desired and previously agreed targets;223 as such, it does not serve the more 
common function of “compensating” third countries or the “international 
community” in the event of incidents or incompliance.  “There seems to be 
an evident need to coordinate the Ozone Regime with the Climate Change 
Regime, since some of the substitute substances to ozone-depleting gases 
are classified as greenhouse gases under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 
[…] UNFCCC.”224  As China is set to organise around a few megalopolis225 
and its GDP has quintupled between 2000 and 2020, it shall remain seized 
on the matter in order to avoid pollution-congestion phenomena. 
 
IV.2   “Keeping face” amid internationalism and transnationalism 
 
At present, environmentally, China defines itself as a “responsible 
developing country”226 that intends to protect the environment also beyond 
its borders, as a necessary component of its model of “shared future” (or 
“common destiny”) for mankind [人类命运共同体].227  If we assume as 
true that “climate change can be seen as a potentially unique opportunity to 
develop more rational and egalitarian international governance structures 
and normative reforms not at variance with the principle of ‘sustainable 
development’,”228 the relevant questions are whether China: 1) looks 
forward to a more egalitarian legal governance or tends to adapt to existing 
schemes by aspiring to replacing its current game-holders;229 2) deems 
 
222. Charlotte M.J. Streck, Financial instruments and cooperation in implementing 
international agreements for the global environment, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW 
493, 498 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006). 
223. Donald L. Goldberg (U.N. Ambassador) et al., Effectiveness of trade and 
positive measures in multilateral environmental agreements: Lessons from the Montreal 
Protocol, 103 UNEP (1997) (Background paper prepared by the Center for International 
Environmental Law for the United Nations Environment Programme).  
224. NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON & LAL KURUKULASURIYA, UNEP TRAINING MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 106 (2006). 
225. Min Shao et al., City Clusters in China: Air and Surface Water Pollution, 4 
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 353, 353-61 (2006). 
226.  Second National Communication on Climate Change of The People’s Republic 
of China 14, 101 (2012). 
227. Liza Tobin, Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic 
Challenge for Washington and Its Allies, 2 TEX. NAT’L SECURITY R. 154, 164 (2018). 
228. Chechi, supra note 113, at 193. 
229. In fact, it has been postulated that “if we think of China in terms of 
exceptionalism we are incapable of understanding the current international legal order;” see 
Maria Adele Carrai, Global Constitutionalism and the Challenge of China’s 
Exceptionalism, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT GLOBAL DEMOCRACY (?), 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS 21, 108 (Claudio Corradetti & 
Giovanni Sartor eds., 2016), https://perma.cc/5SXX-T5AU.  
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development to be subjected to its “sustainable” qualification; 3) reputes 
climate change a sufficiently strong leverage to enhance its forthcoming 
role as “responsible superpower” in the community of nations; and 4) will 
keep its promises and resolutions, when tested against reality in the short 
as well as long run, including potential slowdown in its annual GDP 
growth.  One may wonder, by way of exemplification, whether China’s 
authoritarian environmentalism is capable of securing the outcomes it 
strives for, when tested against more democratic modes of environmental 
governance.230  In other words, the dilemma does not only concern how 
China behaves today—when, borrowing from comparative economic-
history literature, it might be said to benefit from the “advantage of 
backwardness,”231 but how it would act in forwardness if/when acquiring 
superpower responsibilities; no one can predict the future, yet some insights 
can be inferred by retracing China’s behaviour in recent history.  Beijing’s 
rebuttal of decentralisation in such a vast and populated country learns from 
a past regulatory chaos made of “fragmented authority and problems of 
accountability,”232 but it is not limited to that: China’s authoritarianism in 
environmental policymaking envisions an interpretation of the Executive’s 
role domestically, yet also of China in international affairs towards the 
edification of an allegedly “new” world order.  While Chinese leaders keep 
tightening their grip domestically, the foundation of the world order they 
 
230. See Bruce Gilley, Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to 
climate change, 21 ENVTL. POL. 287, 287–307 (2012). 
231. See, e.g., Alexander Gerschenkron, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS 5–30 (1962).  In broad political terms, this advantage 
translates in the chance for China to pledge industrial commitments and deploy rhetorical 
artifices that would possibly be untenable or no longer strategically convenient if it were a 
superpower like the US is today.  Economically, instead, backwardness implies that China 
could “adopt production methods with lower emission and/or resource intensity that were 
developed by industrialized nations; implement environmental policies based on scientific 
knowledge on environmental pollution and damage; and promote industrial sites leading to 
low emission intensity in the early stages of economic development[, thus dodging] the 
serious environmental deterioration and pollution industrialized nations have experienced 
and ‘tunnel[ling] through.’”  See Akihisa Mori, Sustainable development and environmental 
governance, in East Asia, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 4 (2013).  See also Justin Yifu Lin [林毅夫], China’s growth 
miracle in the context of Asian transformation, WIDER Working Paper No. 92 5 n.5 (2018).  
Economics literature suggests that despite the advantage-of-backwardness manifesto, “less 
developed nations need to make a number of foundational investments in their own 
technological capabilities in order to subsequently be able to adopt the green technologies 
developed in the ‘North’ and adapt them to their particular settings.  Whether investments 
in green innovation in the ‘North’ will strengthen the incentives of less developed nations 
sufficiently to lead them to invest in the required absorptive capacity is an open empirical 
question.”  See Philippe Mario Aghion & Xavier Jaravel, Knowledge Spillovers, Innovation 
and Growth, 125(583) THE ECON. J. 533, 538 (2015). 
232. Michael G. Faure et al., Bucking the Kuznets curve: Designing effective 
environmental regulation in developing countries, 51 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 65, 122 (2010). 
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strive to pursue and ultimately champion rests on an anti-imperialistic, 
democratic system of global governance.  Although the self-restrained 
accomplishment of this plan is far from granted, on the conceptual plane it 
does not stand in contradiction to the Party’s autocratic rule: “democracy” 
as intended by Beijing is that between States in the international relations 
of a multipolar, no-longer-American world, and not that within States 
(although one might obviously wonder whether the former, as a cornerstone 
of Westphalian international law, is truly meaningful—of even long-term 
feasible—in the absence of domestic accountability mechanisms for 
internationally negotiated and implemented policies). 
The fear of “losing face” being paramount in China, one overall 
forecast could be that the Chinese would prefer to contribute their share to 
a common international fund whilst adhering to the “classical” state 
responsibility in general, rather than being held liable in particular 
transboundary cases and settle those cases “at pair with” individual 
claimants from third countries.  Apart from China that would contribute 
internationally whilst keeping its face transnationally, usually States settle 
these cases bilaterally or multi-bilaterally233 by facing their specific liability 
on a case-by-case basis, as they find this last solution more convenient both 
money- and time-wise.  The 2005 Songhua River incident between China 
and Russia,234 involving petrochemical plants and originated between the 
two northernmost Chinese industrial cities of Jilin and Harbin, is to be 
recalled in passing as a “case-study within the case-study;” this is 
illustrative because of the close geopolitical ties between the two States, in 
that politics in this field cannot be easily dismissed or discerned from the 
law. Not secondarily, 
 
while the possibility of severe punitive sanctions should in 
theory deter violations, they can also, ironically, deter officials 
from disclosing pollution, as they fear personal liability [. . . 
F]earing such retribution, local officials in Jilin initially withheld 
information about the Songhua River toxic spill from 
 
233. See for example, the legally multifaceted collaboration between Singapore and 
Indonesia to prevent transboundary “haze pollution:”  Kexian Ng, Transboundary Haze 
Pollution in Southeast Asia: The Effectiveness of Three Forms of International Legal 
Solutions, 10 J. OF EAST ASIA & INT’L L. 221 (2017) (“Multi-bilateralism” stands for the 
pursuance and fulfilment of bilateral interests and commitments through multilateral 
settings (at times pretentiously, other times transparently), and this makes it a hybrid form 
of international cooperation, intermediate between bilateralism and multilateralism). 
234. See Xuyu Hu, The doctrine of liability fixation of state responsibility in the 
convention on transboundary pollution damage, 20 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 179, 182 
(2020). 
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environmental agencies, government officials in the downriver 
province of Heilongjiang and Beijing, and the public.235 
 
V.  China, Domestically 
 
[I]n conceptualizing the law of property as it applies to 
environmental protection, we could learn a good deal from the 
Romans. We can conceive of seashores, for example, not as areas 
subject to unlimited private rights, but as places over which the 
[S]tate exercises a trust for the benefit of the public. That view is 
now reflected in some American cases.236 
 
V.1    China and Western capitalism: from energy and the environment 
to the environment and culture 
 
Energy and environmental policies are similarly bound to common 
fate,237 through a link the EU struggles to match in its external action, owing 
to its responsibilities distribution across several Directorates-General and 
the overall “constitutional” configuration of the EU as a sui iuris 
organisation.238  This is regrettable: “China is a huge global energy polluter 
due to the extensive use of coal, and making China share the EU views on 
the link between energy, energy security and climate change [would be] 
therefore of crucial importance.”239 Similiter, the argument goes for the 
interdependency between natural and cultural heritage.240 
 
235. Allison Moore & Adria Warren, Legal Advocacy in Environmental Public 
Participation in China: Raising the Stakes and Strengthening Stakeholders, 8 CHINA ENV’T 
SERIES 3, 13 (2006). 
236. James Russell Gordley, The Enforcement of Foreign Law: Reclaiming One 
Nation’s Cultural Heritage in Another Nation’s Courts, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 
CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 110, 122 (James Russell Gordley & Francesco Francioni eds., 
2013).  For the concept of “public trusteeship” in the law of Ancient Rome, see Brian John 
Preston, The Evolving Role of Environmental Rights in Climate Change Litigation, 2 
CHINESE J. OF ENVTL L. 131, 136 (2018). 
237. See, e.g., Maria Kenig-Witkowska, The European Union Perspective on 
Cultural Heritage and Climate Change Issues, 3 J. OF COMP. URB. L. & POL’Y 63, 73–4 
(2019). 
238. See Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, The Resilience of the Paris 
Agreement: Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime, 31 GEO. ENVTL L. REV. 1, 
34, 40 (2018). 
239. Jakub M. Godzimirski and Nina Græger, Conclusion: The EU, Energy, and 
Global Power Shifts, EU LEADERSHIP IN ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: 
GLOBAL AND LOCAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 203, 208 (Jakub M. Godzimirski ed., 
2016). 
240. Margherita Paola Poto, Environmental Regulation in China through the lens of 
the European Model, 18 ASIA PAC. J. OF ENVTL. L. 69, 84 (2016). 
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Although “China’s Ecological Civilisation” [Zhōngguó shēngtài 
wénmíng, 中国 生态文明] is built on an autocratic, bombastic, top-down 
and hierarchical—but politically driven—version of the Western academic 
concept of the “Anthropocene,”241 China’s cultural heritage strategy for 
inclusive growth emphasises the economic impact of such heritage over its 
societal implications.242  This cannot surprise all those who noticed that 
despite pretences of differentiation on moral grounds,243 the Chinese model 
has not been able to express any serious alternative to the exploitative 
anthropocentric model invented by post-Medieval Europeans,244 which 
captures the quintessence of humans as the exclusive uncontested masters 
of the Earth245 (both natural and cultural forms of heritage included).  In 
fact, the “idealisation of “communist” China as somehow an ecotopian 
prototype [ . . . ] seems very misplaced in the wake of post-Tiananmen 
Square capitalist China.”246  As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
Europe and other Western actors (e.g., Canada) are striving to remedy to 
their historical legacy by propelling a new model based on human-nature 
conceptual interdependence and operative integration, which has not yet 
appealed to China (perhaps out of fears of renewed separatism247).  This is 
 
241. Coraline Goron, Ecological Civilisation and the Political Limits of a Chinese 
Concept of Sustainability, 4 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 39, 43–5 (2018). 
242. BRITISH COUNCIL 2018, CULTURAL HERITAGE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH, at 18. 
https://perma.cc/6J67-BSD3. 
243. “For a fruitful intellectual dialogue on sustainability involving China to take 
place, it is essential to distinguish between those who try to develop an [Ecological 
Civilisation] theory based on political philosophy principles and a general interrogation of 
the means and ends of economic and political modernity based on the Chinese experience, 
from those who hold that [Ecological Civilisation] designates the model of environmental 
governance carried out by the Chinese government today.  This cannot be achieved when 
theory and practice are confused and when the global rise of China is simplistically equated 
with the replacement of an ‘ecocidal’ Western hegemony by a presumably more 
‘ecologically civilised’ Chinese hegemony” (and the reverse, obviously).  Goron, supra note 
241, at 49–50. 
244. Franz M. Hartmann, Towards a Social Ecological Politics of Sustainability, 
POLITICAL ECOLOGY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL 329, 335–340 (Roger H. Keil et al. ed., 1998); 
Paul G. Harris, Environmental values in a globalising world: The case of China, 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN A GLOBALISING WORLD: NATURE, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE 
123, 124–25 (Jouni Paavola & Ian Lowe eds., (2005).  Confucianism is particularly prone 
to nature exploitation; see PETER HAY, MAIN CURRENTS IN WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL 
THOUGHT 97 (2002). 
245. WESTON & BOLLIER, supra note 178, at 49; see also UPAMANYU PABLO 
MUKHERJEE, POSTCOLONIAL ENVIRONMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE AND THE CONTEMPORARY 
INDIAN NOVEL IN ENGLISH 62 (2010); Thomas Sparks, The Place of the Environment in State 
of Nature Discourses: Reassessing nature, property and sovereignty in the Anthropocene, 
10 MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 17 (2020). 
246. DAVID E. PEPPER, MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 96 (1996). 
247. Joseph Kowalski, Environmentalism Isn’t New: Lessons from Indigenous Law, 
26 BUFFALO ENVTL. L.J. 15, 51 (2019). 
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perhaps because China has a few minorities but not diverse “indigenous 
populations” like e.g., Canada, Australia, or Indonesia do,248 which is an 
additional reason why it has not (yet) “absorbed” indigenous claims and 
developed a public discourse to channel this sort of novel orientations.249  
Recognising the interfaces between natural and cultural heritage is easier 
for those who have built their survival upon a harmonious, non-exploitative 
relationship with their surroundings. “Indigenous environmentalism [. . .] 
has grounded itself in the idea that human use of the land is fundamental to 
the well-being of both people and nature.  The natural community is 
incomplete without active human membership,”250 fashioned 
participatorily at the street level.251 It is no accident that the 1989 
International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples asks governments to ”ensure that, whenever 
appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-operation with the peoples 
concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact 
 
248. CLAUDIA SOBREVILA, THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION: THE NATURAL BUT OFTEN FORGOTTEN PARTNERS 3 (The World Bank 2008) 
(“[I]n Mexico and China the total population of Indigenous Peoples is large [ . . . ], while 
the diversity of ethnic groups is relatively low [. . .].  In contrast, Brazil, Indonesia, and the 
United States have a low number of indigenous inhabitants […] while their diversity is 
relatively high [. . .].  Where the population of Indigenous Peoples is low, they tend to face 
greater threats because they represent true minority groups”); see also id. at 20.   
249. “At the normative level, an attitude of legal pluralism also creates space for a 
much larger variety of norms that may be employed to devise cooperative solutions to the 
global climate and biodiversity crises. For example, [. . .] the “slow activism” inherent in 
indigenous [. . .] narratives can be employed to deconstruct and reshape definitions of the 
Anthropocene associated with mono-cultural representations.  In some Pacific Island 
nations, local systems of customary resource use are increasingly recognised as valuable 
normative approaches to environmental management as communities are seeking to cope 
with the adverse effects of climate change [. . .].  These local systems are often undervalued 
or ignored in international environmental law, in part because they tend to be located in oral 
histories and other forms of intangible cultural heritage differing starkly from formal legal 
sources.”  Justin Rose et al., Primal Scene to Anthropocene: Narrative and Myth in 
International Environmental Law, 66 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 441, 468 (2019); see also 
Environmental Rule of Law – First Global Report, at 164, UNEP 2019; International Law 
Commission, Sixty-eighth Session, Third report on the protection of the environment in 
relation to armed conflicts (submitted by the Special Rapporteur, H.E. Marie G. Jacobsson), 
¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/700 (2016). 
250. LANCE NEWMAN, THE LITERARY HERITAGE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT: LANDSCAPES OF REVOLUTION IN TRANSATLANTIC ROMANTICISM 95 (2019) 
(emphasis added). 
251. See generally Stephen Stec, Developing Standards for Procedural 
Environmental Rights through Practice: The Changing Character of Rio Principle 10, 
PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLE X IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 18 (Jerzy 
Jendrośka & Magdalena Bar eds., 2018). 
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on them of planned development activities.”252  Accordingly, what the 
“lawyers of the Anthropocene” advocate is not a complete and utopian 
human withdrawal from nature, but rather a balanced, respectful, and 
harmonious coexistence between humans and natural landscapes (not 
natural resources) that stands in line with the unifying theory of natural and 
cultural heritage in their inextricable essentiality for “their” local 
communities. Said lawyers of the Anthropocene interpret liability schemes 
as transformative agents from commutative to restorative to distributional 
justice—that is, a generative, autopoietic justice rather than an extractive 
one.  As one scholar recently put it, “our laws about nature should be 
consistent with the laws of nature.”253  Considering that China suffers from 
the absence of an indigenous population that can keep lawmakers on-guard 
about the sophistication and ineluctability of human-nature linkages, it 
would be a fortiori desirable that such linkages were enforced upon China 
via international liability arrangements featuring nature-heritage 
interactions and emphasising the “hidden,” profound meanings thereof. 
Confirming the general considerations in the previous paragraphs, the 
1992 China’s Maritime Code provides that “without prejudice to the right 
of claims for loss of life or personal injury, claims with respect to damage 
to harbor works, basins and waterways, and aids to navigation have priority 
over other property claims”254 (arguably including culturally-significant 
ones).  Keeping the form and rejecting the substance, however, one may 
take inspiration from this provision, insofar as one way of protecting 
cultural heritage of universal value via complying with the World Heritage 
Convention would be that of granting damages to such a heritage a similarly 
phrased priority. 
In sum, China has made unhoped-for progress as far as environmental 
awareness is concerned255—involving both home companies and the supply 
 
252. ILO Convention, No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, at 8 (1989) (art. 
7(3) (emphasis added); see also Jeremy Firestone et al., Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, 
and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Environmental 
Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2005); Klemetti Näkkäläjärvi & Pekka 
Kauppala, Sacred Sites of the Sámi – Linking Past, Present and Future, EXPERIENCING AND 
PROTECTING SACRED NATURAL SITES OF SÁMI AND OTHER INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE 
SACRED ARCTIC (Leena Heinämäki & Thora Martina Herrmann eds., 2017). 
253. Jan G. Laitos, How Science Has Influenced, But Should Now Determine, 
Environmental Policy, 43 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 759, 761 (2019) (emphasis 
omitted). 
254. Bingying Dong, &, Ling Zhu, Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances: Chinese Perspective, 
50 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 209, 219 (2019). 
255. See Xiaoyi Jiang & Jianwei Zhang, China’s Legislative Practices on Climate 
Change after the Paris Agreement, 10 J. OF EAST ASIA AND INT’L L. 259 (2017) (brief 
overview of China’s central and regional legislation on environmental pollution in the 
aftermath of the Paris Agreement); see also Zhilin Mu et al., Environmental Legislation in 
China: Achievements, Challenges and Trends, 6 SUSTAINABILITY, 8967 (t.1) (2014).   
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chain of multinational corporations256—but it has still a long way to go 
before satisfactorily translating this awareness into effectively enforceable 
mandates on liability. 
 
V.2    Civil liability for environmental damages 
 
Differently from virtually all civil-law jurisdictions, China had had no 
comprehensive civil code until very recently: it is only in January 2021 that 
the Chinese civil law, previously spread across sector-specific pieces of 
legislation subordinated to the General Principles of the Civil Law of 
China, will find updated systematisation in an enforceable PRC Civil Code.  
To be sure, in the area of liability the Civil Code confines itself to the 
reception of what the General Principles and dedicated laws had already 
contemplated, with minor additions.  The only difference—a rather 
theoretical one—is that with the Civil Code, liability provisions are uplifted 
to the status of “basic law” within the Chinese Constitution’s definition.257  
The General Principles provided that “[c]ivil liability shall still be borne 
even in the absence of fault, if the law [so] stipulates,”258 and that “[a]ny 
person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in 
violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the 
prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with the 
law.”259  On the other hand, “[i]f any person causes damage to other people 
by engaging in operations that are greatly hazardous to the surroundings [. 
. .], he shall bear civil liability [. . .].”260  In sum, only those who engage in 
ultrahazardous operations impacting other humans bear liability no matter 
what, whilst others’ liability is conditional upon further qualifications 
related to other sector-specific laws. Said sector-specific legislation may 
well be, in this case, China’s Tort Liability Law (“TLL”) promulgated on 
26th December 2009, in force from 1st July 2010;261 it provides that “[i]n 
the event of any dispute arising from environmental pollution, the polluter 
shall bear the burden of proof with regard to the legal basis for bearing no 
liability or mitigation of its liability and the nonexistence of causation 
between its act and the harmful consequences.”262  The TLL further 
prescribes that “[w]here any harm is caused by environmental pollution for 
 
256. SAM YOONSUK LEE ET AL., GREEN LEADERSHIP IN CHINA: MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES FROM CHINA’S MOST RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES 63–64 (2014). 
257. See ZHU WANG, ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPILING A CIVIL CODE OF 
CHINA: A PROCESS MAP FOR LEGISLATION BORN OUT OF PRAGMATISM 77–81 (2020). 
258. Civil Code art. 106 (China) (emphasis added). 
259. Id. at art. 124 (emphasis added). 
260. Id. at art. 123. 
261. Id. (An unofficial yet authoritative English translation is available at 
https://perma.cc/3ESC-LV9G.) 
262. Id. at art. 66. 
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the fault of a third party, the injured party may require compensation from 
either the polluter or the third party.”263  This latter provision is deemed to 
confirm the Chinese fault-independent approach to liability in civil 
litigation in environmental matters (as well as generally).264  As 
environmental cases always turn to complex (and costly)265 evidentiary 
appraisals and this burden-of-proof shift onto defenders is extremely, 
indeed, burdensome for the latter, Chinese courts “often split the blame for 
losses, a legal concept known as shared liability.  In a 2004 case in 
Shāndōng, for example, two fish farmers only received 51 per cent of their 
requested compensation on the grounds that they should have sought 
government help mitigating the effects of an oil spill.”266  The new Civil 
Code maintains the scheme reported above, whilst extending the scope of 
the damages (not only “environmental,” but also “ecological”) and 
introducing punitive damages in the case of wilful harm,267 together with a 
right to public-interest litigation which is not fully clarified.268  China’s 
faultless-liability approach to environmental pollution was also confirmed 
by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) Judicial Interpretation269 on the 
 
263. SAM YOONSUK LEE ET AL., supra note 233, at art. 68. 
264. Adam J. Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10895, 10897 (2011). 
265. See Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More: Combating 
Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public Interest 
Litigation and Public Participation, PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 795, 812–813 (2008). 
266. Rachel E. Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 THE 
CHINA QUARTERLY 294, 302 (2011) (“Shared liability” may correspond to joint liability, 
several liability, or joint and several liability in Western common law, depending on the 
case in point; yet, it does not perfectly overlap with any of them, which is one of the many 
issues to be aware of when it comes to international negotiations on these technical 
“legalise” details.).  
267. See Jason E. Kelley, Seeking Justice for Pollution Victims in China: Why China 
Should Amend the Tort Liability Law to Allow Punitive Damages in Environmental Tort 
Cases, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 572, 572-57 (2012) (punitive damages had been already 
suggested in legal scholarship); Vincent R. Johnson, Punitive Damages, Chinese Tort Law, 
and the American Experience, 9 FRONTIERS OF L. IN CHINA 321, 326 (2014). 
268. See Tiantian Zhai & Yen-Chiang Chang, The Contribution of China’s Civil Law 
to Sustainable development: Progress and Prospects, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 294, 304 (2019) 
(comparison between the ante and post Code environmental liability regime). 
269. PRC law endows the SPC with the license to interpret very specific questions 
regarding the application of laws, regulations, and decrees at all levels of Chinese judicial 
proceedings; such interpretations are doctrinally deemed de facto binding.  Zhōnghuá 
rénmín gònghéguó fǎyuàn zǔzhī fǎ (中华人民共和国人民法院组织法) [The Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Organization of the People’s Courts] (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China) art. 
33.  For an overview of the legal instruments employed by the SPC to quasi-legislate within 
the PRC’s civil-law system, see Susan Finder, The “Soft Law” of the Supreme People’s 
Court, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT MONITOR, https://perma.cc/VG34-W2ZQ. 
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Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over Liability for 
Environmental Torts,270 which further specified that 
the tort claimant should establish the “relatedness” (关联性) 
rather than the “causality” between the emissions and the pollution 
impact in issue, which clearly dilutes the burden of proof for 
environmental tort claimants. [. . .] If the claimant succeeds, the 
defendant, in turn, must provide evidence to prove that there is no 
causal relationship between the polluting behaviour and the 
damage.271 
 
Interestingly, liability in the absence of fault was also part of China’s 
trade strategy till recently: 
 
previously there had been a legislative trend to focus 
environmental responsibility for polluting factories onto “finished 
goods producers”.  These finished goods producers c[ould] be 
final assembling factories or distributors along the supply chain.  
This approach contrasted with that of the [EU], which puts 
responsibility directly onto “producers” to identify all 
environment-related data along the supply chain.  Under the 
[Energy-using Product Directive] of the EU, companies have to 
report total energy used during a product’s lifecycle, including the 
energy used during manufacturing and transportation.  China has 
moved in this direction with the [2002 Clean Production 
Promotion Law].  This law has introduced the concept of producer 
responsibility and life-cycle approach for both resource use and 
waste management.272 
 
The fact that differently from virtually all tort laws, the Chinese one 
provides for liability of parties not at fault in several circumstances, owes 
to the peculiar socio-political configuration of the country.  “Chinese 
academia often views tort law as a private law, which supposedly 
recognizes the individual autonomy of the parties more than any other areas 
of law.  In fact, however, the TLL is deeply characterized by socialism and 
is used as a tool to maintain social stability, which is the overwhelming goal 
 
270. 最高人民法院关于审理环境侵权责任纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释, 
adopted at the 1,644th Session of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on 
February 9, 2015, effective on June 3, 2015, art. 1. 
271. Yue Zhao et al., Prospects for Climate Change Litigation in China, 8(2) 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 349, 371 (2019). 
272. Feng Lin et al., The political economy of China’s environmental law reforms, 
LAW AND POLICY FOR CHINA’S MARKET SOCIALISM (John Garrick ed., 2012). 
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of the [S]tate.”273  The same control that, at the international level, China 
wants to feel released from. 
One decade ago, Chinese law provided for three collective liability 
schemes, yet rarely enforced (or even enforceable) in practice: the 
Mechanism for Socializing Environmental Risks (“MSER”), the 
Environmental Liability Insurance System (“ELIS”), and the 
Environmental Damage Compensation System (“EDCS”).274  Ten years 
later, too little has changed, despite the fact that courts have specified what 
costs those liable might incur into.  For example, the 2017 SPC’s Judicial 
Interpretation on Compensation for Marine Environmental Damage 
establishes a compensation regime encompassing “(a) the cost of 
preventive measures; (b) the cost of reasonable measures of reinstatement; 
(c) the loss during the period of reinstatement; and (d) the cost of 
investigation and assessment.”275  The only proper advancement comes 
from China’s Environmental Protection Law, which did not mention 
liabilities in 1979 yet includes liability and compensation in its 2014 
revision,276 while keeping with China’s long history of allowing for multi-
plaintiff lawsuits seeking compensation.277  Notable, too, is that in 
December 2007 the then-State Environmental Protection Agency 
(subsequently “PRC Ministry of Environmental Protection,” now “PRC 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment”), jointly with China’s Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, issued the Guidelines on the Development of 
Pollution Liability Insurance, which have been be promoted in pilot cities 
and provinces including Hunan, Hubei and Jiangsu, Ningbo, Shenyang, 





273. Liu Chenglin, Socialized Liability in Chinese Tort Law, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 16, 
17 (2018); see also Wei Zhang, Understanding the Law of Torts in China: A Political 
Economy Perspective, 11 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 171 (2016) (reiterating these observations 
but through a more economic prism). 
274. See Canfa Wang et al., Pondering over the incident of Songhua River pollution 
from the perspective of environmental law, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 294–96 (Michael G. Faure 
and Song Ying eds., 2008). 
275. Dong, supra note 254, at 214. 
276. Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Huánjìng Bǎohùfǎ (中华人民共和国环境保护
法（主席令第九号）) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 
2015), art 5, 6, 52, ch. VI (China). 
277. Tyler Liu, China’s Revision to the Environmental Protection Law: Challenges 
to Public Interest Litigation and Solutions for Increasing Public Participation and 
Transparency, 6 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 60, 65 (2015).  
278. Lin, supra note 272, at 109. 
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V.3    The paradoxical Chinese attitudes in the “private” sector 
 
Framed against stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory respectively, 
business and sociological analyses have concluded that the non-binding 
expectations of the Chinese government are forcing environmentally-
unfriendly state-owned companies out of the market.279  Indeed, Chinese 
large firms are increasingly engaged in voluntary corporate environmental 
reporting due to paradoxically 
 
coercive [institutional] isomorphism, whereby the Chinese 
government links incentives such as grants and contracts and 
access to resources to explicit [corporate social responsibility]. 
Although the [corporate environmental reporting] policies from 
the Chinese government do not take the form of traditional 
coercive [mandates] based on hard law, regulations, or taxes [. . 
.], the authoritarian capitalist institutional structures and 
environment mean that the incentives [. . .] that the [S]tate 
introduces [are] perceived by Chinese firms to be mandatory in 
nature [in the market’s level playing field].280 
 
 
279. See Hui Situ and Carol Ann Tilt, Chinese government as a determinant of 
corporate environmental reporting: A study of large Chinese listed companies, 18 J. ASIA-
PAC. CENT. FOR ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY 251 (2012); see also Hui Situ and Carol Ann Tilt, 
Mandatory? Voluntary? A Discussion of Corporate Environmental Disclosure 
Requirements in China, 38 SOC. & ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY J. 131 (2018).  Interestingly, 
this dynamic is not at play in the neighbouring India when it comes to e.g., liability for 
nuclear damage.  Pursuant to the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, the 
Government takes over the compensation quota applicable to liable state-owned companies 
whenever said compensation exceeds the statutory amount specified in the Act.  See M.P. 
Ram Mohan, Indian Civil Nuclear Liability Law (CNLD Act): An Adventurism or 
Exceptionalism in International Legal Discourse, LOCATING INDIA IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Srinivas Burra and R. Rajesh Babu eds., 2018). To better 
contextualise the Act, see also Ayushi Sutaria, Placing the Indian civil nuclear liability 
regime in context: The extent of supplier’s liability, 17 J. RISK RES., 97 (2014). 
280. Hui Situ et al., The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental 
Reporting in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective, 56 BUS. & SOC’Y 1, 31 
(2018). 
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In a country where the silencing (often turning to self-censorship) of 
NGOs, specialised press, and civil activism still represents the norm,281 
where governmental policies about the environment can be only barely 
challenged by the ordinary citizens,282 and where “the Government [ . . . ] 
remains concerned that environmental activism could lead to a broader 
push for political reform,”283 this de facto coercion blending normative 
flexibility and market competition, which economists define as “induced 
innovation,” appears to be the only leverage for the Party to build 
responsible economic communities and gain their trust.284  This is 
supported by an upholding of the piercing-the-corporate-veil doctrine, 
explicitly codified in the 2005 PRC’s Company Law,285 as much as by 
foreign competition.286  However, most emitters in China are state-owned 
either formally or practically, and public or public-equivalent companies 
notoriously (although somewhat counterintuitively) respond less flexibly to 
the solicitations of legal and financial incentives introduced by 
 
281. Yet, the strategies implemented by those same actors to resurface and bring their 
claims and views forward should not be downplayed; to the contrary, some of those 
strategies are becoming increasingly effective, forcing authorities into openness, fairness, 
and transparency, though within the context of an authoritarian State overall.  For an 
illustration of this tension that demonstrates how mentioned “green emancipation” is at least 
a two-decade-long tale, see Peter Ho, Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs 
and Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 893 (2002); see also Jude Howell et al., 
Accountability and legitimacy of NGOs under authoritarianism: The case of China, 41 
THIRD WORLD Q. 113 (2020). 
282. ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW 
CHINESE STATE 184 (Oxford University Press, 2018); Genia Kostka and Chunman Zhang, 
Tightening the grip: Environmental governance under Xi Jinping, 27 ENVTL POLITICS 769, 
772 (2018); contra Johann L. Thibaut, An Environmental Civil Society in China? Bridging 
Theoretical Gaps through a Case Study of Environmental Protest, 42 INTERNATIONALES 
ASIENFORUM 135 (2011). 
`283.Yixian Sun, The Changing Role of China in Global Environmental Governance, 1 
RISING POWERS Q. 43, 48 (2016). 
284. One of the issues for the Party at the central level is that China’s Environmental 
Protection Bureaus which are supposed to monitor environmental compliance on the ground 
at the local level are administered by officials who are appointed and funded by the 
provincial delegates of the Party itself, so that mutual protectionism to “look clean” before 
the higher ranks is still widespread, despite attempts at reforming this system and breaking 
this vicious circle by emphasising efficiency instead.  Jessica Scott, From Environmental 
Rights to Environmental Rule of Law: A Proposal for Better Environmental Outcomes, 6 
MICH. J. OF ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 203, 226 (2016); see also Benjamin van Rooij et al., The 
Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Understanding China’s New Environmental 
Actors, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 3 (2014). 
285. See Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and 
Where Is It Heading?, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743 (2012). 
286. See, e.g., Daniel Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century 
Environmental Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 55 (2017). 
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governmental apparatuses.287  “The growing dominance of [s]tate 
ownership (especially in China, India, Iran, Mexico, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia) reduces the mitigation potential of investor-led disclosure,”288 thus 
jeopardising liability.  As Chinese scholars (affiliated to the leading Peking 
University in Beijing) themselves strongly word,289 key state-owned 
enterprises are still de facto unaccountable in China, regardless of any state 
law, provincial regulation, or declaration to the opposite sense at any level 
of the Executive or the courts. State ownership of companies is further 
problematic at the international level, where such enterprises “might 
challenge the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the act of [S]tate 
doctrine, or comity of nations,”290 also before arbitration tribunals;291 in this 
sense, China might have more to lose compared to Western market-driven, 
private-competition-based economies if an international legal lifting of 
such defences were to be agreed upon globally. 
Around the world, beyond criminal charges292 and administrative 
penalties, civil-liability regimes may provide for numerous financial and 
non-financial tools, stemming from the assessment of, among others: 
specific damages; replacement costs; punitive damages; legally defined 
damages; legal costs; interests’ adjustments; and non-monetary 
restitution.293  Nonetheless, China implements a voluntary-first approach to 
 
287. See, e.g., HENRICK BERGSAGER & ANNA KORPPOO, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES AS CLIMATE POLICY ACTORS: THE POWER AND STEEL SECTORS 59 (NORDIC 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 2013), https://perma.cc/B8UJ-HW6A. 
288. Maria L. Banda, The bottom-up alternative: The mitigation potential of private 
climate governance after the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 361 (2018). 
289. See, e.g., Jin Wang et al., Reflections from the transboundary pollution of 
Songhua River, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES 
FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 273, 289 (Michael G. Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008). 
290. Meinhard Doelle & Sara Seck, Loss & Damage from Climate Change: From 
Concept to Remedy?, 20 CLIMATE POL’Y 669, 675 (2020) (emphasis added). 
291. Refer to all pertinent examples reported in Michael Feit, Responsibility of the 
State Under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned 
Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 142, 157 (2010). 
292. For a pertinent summary about China’s environmental criminal legislation, see 
Thomas Richter, Transboundary Environmental Crimes: An Analysis of Chinese and 
European Law, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES 
FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 253, 263–65 (Michael G. Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008); 
see also He & Cliquet, supra note 205, at 160; Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov, 
Environmental Crime and Communication to the Public in China, 22 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 
57, 57–75 (2017). 
293. ANDREW FARMER, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 137–38 (2007). 
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non-compliance,294 whereby not to lose their “face,”295 top managers 
disclose sensitive business information to the enforcement authorities and 
gradually progress towards compliance rather than being sanctioned openly 
and straightaway.296  Although transposing domestic arrangements onto the 
international level is always argumentatively risky, this closely resembles 
the patterns which have increasingly crystallised in multilateral 
environmental instruments, where hard responsibility (standard in 
international law generally) is replaced by soft responsibility in terms of 
expectations to compliance, enforced through soft mechanisms and (at 
times) supported by private liability schemes.297  This is apparently a 
contradiction as, theoretically, China would be supposed to endorse a 
traditional sense of state-centred and sovereignty-rooted responsibility with 
little purchase into “the contemporary international law of co-ordination 
that follows the private law paradigm[, thus] not only based on sovereign 
equality but also on democracy[, solicitations from the private sector,] and 
human rights.”298 
 
VI.  China, internationally 
 
VI.1    China and the ongoing talks on international liability 
 
Intervening at the debates being hosted by the United Nations (“UN”), 
Mr Jia Guide—current Director-General of the Department of Treaty and 
Law of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and representative of China 
at the 19th Meeting of the 6th Committee during the UNGA’s 58th Session 
on 30 October 2003,299 believed 
 
conditions were in place for the International Law 
Commission to pursue an in-depth study on international liability.  
The Commission should carry out more studies on domestic and 
international practices on the topic, to find common denominators 
that would solidly lay the groundwork for a uniform regime.  The 
 
294. But only in this field: in several others, e.g., cybersecurity, companies are 
compelled to disclose incompliance also publicly on penalty of huge fines. 
295. On the concept of “face” in Chinese sociology and management, see e.g., Peter 
C. King & Wei Zhang, The Role of Face in a Chinese Context of Trust and Trust Building, 
18 INT’L J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 149, 149–73 (2018); Qi Xiaoying, Reconstructing the 
Concept of Face in Cultural Sociology: In Goffman’s Footsteps, Following the Chinese 
Case, 4 J. CHINESE SOC. 1, 1–17 (2017). 
296. FARMER, supra note 293, at 146, 155. 
 297. Maljean-Dubois, supra note 108, at 39–41. 
298. Armin von Bogdandy et al., From Public International to International Public 
Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority, 28 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 115, 119 (2017). 
299. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 19th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/58/SR.19 (Oct. 31, 2003). 
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proposed allocation-of-loss regime should combine principles 
with flexibility. China endorsed, in principle, the various proposals 
of the special rapporteur on the scope of the topic and 
compensation for damage to the environment, among others.  He 
said the proposals should be fleshed out and adjusted on the basis 
of further survey of State practice.300 
 
The problem with this statement is that the only way to collect state 
practice emanating from new doctrine or phenomena is by waiting a 
significant amount of time, which may vary depending on the field.  In 
opposition to Italy, The Netherlands, and other countries, China had 
previously—and successfully—argued for limiting ILC drafts to 
transboundary harm on other sovereign territories only, rather than on the 
commons as well.301  In IEL, this helps indeed distinguishing between the 
transboundary-harm regime and the climate-change one, although this is 
not the same as to say that these two issues should in fact be kept separate 
(especially for the purpose of safeguarding cultural heritage). 
 
VI.2    A “developing” China vis-à-vis climate change regimes 
 
Extra-responsibility liability is an essential aspect to scrutinise 
because it addresses a wider spectrum of state actions compared to 
complementary (i.e. responsibility-dependent) liability, but also because 
individual responsibilities of States are, in this field, factually non-
actionable. 
 
[T]here is the idea to attribute climate change-related damage 
to a State based on its historical emissions or to the degree in 
which it fulfils its reduction targets contained in the Kyoto-
Protocol. [. . .]  However, [if] the attribution of responsibility for 
damages is linked to the reduction targets that States willingly 




300. Press Release, 6th Comm. Gen. Assem., Harmful Effects of Transboundary 
Pollution Cited as Key to Proposed Law to Govern International Liability, U.N. Press 
Release GA/L/3241 (Oct. 30, 2003), https://perma.cc/S6ML-ADFU (emphasis added). 
301. See Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Sixth 
Committee, 14th meeting (A/C.6/53/SR.14), p. 6, ¶ 40. 
302. Franziska Knur, The United Nations Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate 
Change – Introducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law, CLIMATE CHANGE 
AS A THREAT TO PEACE: IMPACTS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 37, 48 
(Sabine von Schorlemer & Sylvia Maus eds., 2014). 
5 - VECELLIOSEGATE_HELJ V27-1_ABBY_MCG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/20  2:02 PM 




and this adds to the already reluctant approach shown by most major 
emitters; to start with, this would surely turn off China’s most recent 
enthusiasm for the codification of emission control regimes.  The rationalist 
cost-benefit calculation goes that “[t]he greater the benefits a [S]tate can 
gain from defection, the greater the necessity for deterrence in the form of 
a threat of punishment.  This means the more that [S]tates are required to 
change their behaviour and the greater the incentive to free ride, the greater 
the need for enforcement, incentives and disincentives as 
counterbalances.”303  The question remains however to what extent, to 
punish a country’s firm, that country should be punished for not preventing 
or regulating enough its company’s pollution; indeed, punishing a country 
equates to shifting the burden to its citizens, most of whom might have 
nothing to do with said company’s operations, nor market. 
Before Russia was expelled from the G8, the latter frequently met in 
its 8+5 configuration including not only the eight world-top industrialised 
countries, but also the Group of Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and 
South Africa – not to be confused with the BRICS), and in this wider 
configuration it tried to impact climate change policies at the global level.304 
Contrariwise, 
 
the G20 combines—as institutional equals in a single 
forum—the world’s two leading climate polluters, China and the 
United States, and the world’s major powers and polluters that 
cause and can thus control climate change.  The first eight G20 
summits from 2008 to 2013 dealt increasingly with climate change 
and started to shift the leadership of the world’s evolving climate 
change control regime from the prevailing UN-led, divided, 
development-first one to a new, inclusive, equal, environment-
first one.  But as its ninth summit in 2014 dramatically revealed, 
the G20 faced severe internal divisions and remained unable to 
meet the challenge by creating a full control regime that worked, 
either outside or inside the UN.305 
 
The G7 Summits held in Paris and Houston in 1989 and 1990 
respectively addressed environmental concerns extensively, but China—
invited to participate—could not exercise notable influence on the 
discussion as the diplomatic circles were shocked at the Tiananmen 
 
303. JÜRGEN FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL “SOFT LAW”: THE 
FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF NONBINDING INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE AND LAW 328 (2013). 
304. JOHN JAMES KIRTON & ELLA KOKOTSIS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: G7, G20, AND UN LEADERSHIP 182–84 (2015). 
305. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 9–10. 
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Square’s massacre of unarmed student protesters.306  However, the 
international community could not afford to leave China behind, as in 2005 
it “surpassed the U.S. as the leading emitter of greenhouse gas in the world 
. . . Brazil had surpassed Russia the year before. India had surpassed Japan 
in 1995.  It was clear that climate change could not be controlled unless the 
Rio-Kyoto regime was replaced with one where all major carbon polluters 
were obliged to control their carbon.”307  The 2007 G7 Summit organised 
in Heiligendamm pledged to institutionalise mentioned 8+5 configuration 
with regards to the climate change dossier, and partly succeeded in 
overcoming the dichotomy between Global North and Global South, by 
convincing China and India308 to join the industrialised world’s efforts as 
major emitters.  “Now all countries, including “major emitters,” would act 
together, with the North going furthest and fastest and still transferring 
resources to the South, and the South constraining its carbon as its 
responsibility and capacity allowed.”309  At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, 
China vetoed a funding scheme for climate change initiatives, although an 
agreement was reached about withdrawing fossil-fuel subsidies: “the G20 
successfully reached out to put a[n] inclusive, expanded, innovative regime 
in place.  But it did not revive the failing old UN regime at its next COP, 
taking place in Copenhagen [ten] weeks later,”310 where China vetoed third-
party verification on the actual implementation status of any binding 
commitment. 
This whole digression on the G7/G8/G20 was instrumental for 
illustrating the following paradox: China was “doing more domestically 
than [it was] prepared to agree to internationally;”311 it vetoed both the 
funding scheme and the verification mechanism.  Back then, the popular 
President Obama was attracting praise worldwide, therefore China could 
only emerge meaningfully by opposition;312 conversely, the Trump era has 
been characterised by massive U.S. retreat from leadership in 
 
306. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 81–93. 
307. Id. at 189. 
308. Yet, the United Nations University warns that “[e]ven in the event that a few 
countries like China and India are able to make the leap forward as fast-developing 
countries, the rest of the developing countries will still continue to face serious challenges 
in the international negotiating arena” – Joyeeta Gupta, Increasing Disenfranchisement of 
Developing Country Negotiators in a Multi-Speed World, THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION 
IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE 21, 35 (Jessica F. Green & W. Bradnee 
Chambers eds., 2006) (emphasis added). 
309. KIRTON & KOKOTSIS, supra note 304, at 202. 
310. Id. at 230. 
311. Id. at 250.  
 312. Indeed, during the Paris Agreement negotiations under Obama’s second 
presidential term, China appeared “largely unwilling to take a leadership role before the 
US.”  Luke Kemp, US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement, 17(1) CLIMATE POL’Y 86, 97 
(2017). 
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multilateralism,313 which made it easier for Beijing to “fill the void” and 
gain prominence by proposing itself as a constructive and world-order-
supporting forthcoming superpower.314  The authenticity and genuineness 
of Chinese commitments can be questioned on the ground that they depend 
on Washington’s foreign policy more than on policy stances they 
consistently attempt to uphold before multilateral fora: whenever 
politically convenient, the “propaganda-shaped” national interests of 
distinguishing themselves from the current superpower trump the 
substantive ones inherent in global environmental discourses.  Nonetheless, 
it is fair to note that China’s “environmentalist turn” was inaugurated and 
gradually yet systematically pursued by President Xi during the last two 
years of Obama’s second presidential term, which helped converging 
American and Chinese stances in Paris after the diplomatic blow in 
Copenhagen.  At any rate, by signing the 2014 China-Korea and China-
Switzerland Free Trade Agreements, China committed to high levels of 
environmental protection and not to curb the existing national 
environmental legislation.  This exemplifies what has been termed as the 
“support network” shaping binary negotiations.315  The Chinese turn from 
Copenhagen to Paris was commended internationally316 and functioned 
well as an identity reinforcer for the Party, too, both domestically in terms 
of symbolic legitimacy credited to the pursuance of a state-planned green 
economy,317 and externally, where China was eventually “hailed . . .  as a 
global leader on climate change.”318  However, it shall be emphasised that 
the Paris Agreement does not provide for any enforceable liability regime, 
neither as a corollary of state responsibility for a breach of said stipulation, 
 
313. Yet, this is a long-standing issue in US foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis 
public international law; for an introductive explanation of the American international legal 
isolationism, see, e.g., David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community – The United 
States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
395 (2003). 
314. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56 
WASHBURN L. J. 413, 437 (2017).  See also Adam J. Tooze, Did Xi Just Save the World?, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/77GL-V3RF (trying to make sense of 
China’s pledge at the UN to be carbon-free by 2060).  Furthermore, “the fact that 
environmental stewardship is not a liberal norm, but one arising from shared fates, offers 
[China] the opportunity to offset some of the damage to its image done by its rejection of 
democracy and liberal human rights.”  Robert Falkner & Barry Gordon Buzan, The 
Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a Primary Institution of Global International 
Society, 25(1) EUR. J. INT’L REL. 131, 146 (2019). 
315. DEBBIE DE GIROLAMO, THE FUGITIVE IDENTITY OF MEDIATION: NEGOTIATIONS, 
SHIFT CHANGES AND ALLUSIONARY ACTION 13 (2013). 
316. Anthony H. F. Li, Hopes of Limiting Global Warming? China and the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change, 1 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 49, 50 (2016). 
317. Alex L. Wang, Symbolic Legitimacy and Chinese Environmental Reform, 48 
ENVTL. L. 699, 757–58 (2018). 
318. Id. at 755.  
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nor as a responsibility-independent compensatory scheme for climate 
change-related damages which do not represent a violation of this 
“framework agreement” under public international law.319 
In addition, differential treatments remain dangerous stipulations 
beneficiary States try to take advantage of.320  For instance, exemptions 
based on developmental status might impair the negotiating machine up to 
rendering a global environmental regime ineffective, as occurred in the case 
of the Kyoto Protocol when the US Senate unanimously rejected its 
ratification on the basis that countries like China and India were “unfairly” 
not demanded to comply with the same rules.321  On their part, the Indo-
Chinese alliance rebutted that its contemporary polluting flow matters 
relatively little compared to the polluting stock cumulated by industrial 
power over the last three centuries.322  One possible solution was to provide 
“compensation to developing countries for the costs that would promote 
using the most efficient energy technologies.  Another suggestion [wa]s for 
advanced countries to acquire emission rights issued by developing 
countries. A third proposal [was to implement] a common tax framework 
with cross-border transfers.”323  Accounting for the fact that long-standing 
polluters like the US or the UK could not foresee the environmental effects 
of their industrial development till relatively recently, someone suggested 
the application of a sort of “faultless liability” scheme according to which 
such countries would not be held declaratively responsible for said 
pollution, while still being liable to compensate (at least in the form of 
higher standards to be upheld in present times) for the damage caused to 
the planet over the last three centuries.324  Other scholars rebutted that there 
is no reason to make those countries pay if they are not considered 
responsible, as the two things shall come together;325 this notwithstanding, 
mentioned rebutting scholars fail to appreciate two elements: that liability 
 
319. Maryam al-Dabbagh, Towards a Middle Path: Loss & Damage in the 2015 
Paris Agreement, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (2016), https://perma.cc/DN5Y-QCGD; see also 
Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, 
92 INT’L AFF. 1107, 1117 (2016).  
320. ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, 
EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER 110–11 (2006).  
321. LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12 (2012).  President Bush himself played a resolutive role towards 
this rejection.  See generally Greg Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush 
Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548 (2003).  
322. CARLOS M. PELÁEZ & CARLOS A.  PELÁEZ, GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE: 
TRADE AGREEMENTS, INEQUALITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND VULNERABILITIES VOLUME II 62 (2008). 
323. Id. at 63.  
324. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 
INT’L AFF. 531,  535–36 (1999). 
325. See, e.g., Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global 
Climate Change, 18 L.J.I.L. 747, 762 (2005).  
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without responsibility is a useful legal device to address a factual situation 
without losing oneself in endless doctrinal debates on whose fault it is from 
an abstractly doctrinal standpoint; and that the bona fide ignorance of such 
countries is highly debatable, given the obviousness of those effects on the 
ecosystem even before non-expert eyes.  Beyond this specific dispute, no 
doubt exists that legal devices like liability need a rethinking as to converge 
towards the needs of the Anthropocene, “likely to force a re-evaluation of 
the legal irrelevance of small scale individual actions” that, through big 
numbers, escalate their effects rapidly and call for an equally ready legal 
response before things precipitate irreversibly.326 
The interesting fact is that China would face today several criticism 
when relying on its supposedly “developing” status, which has already been 
questioned by several industrialised States327 as well as by the World Bank 
and the WTO among other bodies.328  When negotiating the global climate 
change regime, developed countries decided to disapply the concept of 
“common heritage of mankind”329 with reference to the atmosphere, as “to 
steer away from policies that might encourage distributional and 
collectivistic approaches to global resource management;”330 those same 
collectivistic approaches do, in theory, subsume the ideological 
foundations of the Chinese state, population, and ruling class (“socialism 
with Chinese characteristics;” “socialist market economy”).  Consequently, 
one would expect China to uphold such vision of the world society in all 
circumstances, including its potential “upgrading” to developed-country 
status and possible overtaking of the US as the only superpower.  The 
Director of Leiden University’s Grotius Centre for International Legal 
Studies speaks about the commons as being treated like “common sink” by 
world’s great powers,331 and despite the brutal expression, he might not 
stand too far from the truth; a few hopes do still hold, however, with regards 
 
326. Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–45 (2017).  
327. Clara Weinhardt & Tobias T. Brink, Varieties of Contestation: China’s Rise 
and the Liberal Trade Order, 27 REV.  INT’L POL. ECON. 258, 268 (2020). 
328. On the untenability of this dichotomy, see Rostam Josef Neuwirth, A 
Constitutional Tribute to Global Governance: Overcoming the Chimera of the Developing-
Developed Country Dichotomy, 2010/20 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE [EUI] WORKING 
PAPERS (2010) (It.); see also Rostam Josef Neuwirth, Global Law and Sustainable 
Development: Change and the “Developing-Developed Country” Terminology, 29 EUR. J. 
DEV. RES. 911 (2017); Rostam Josef Neuwirth, “BRICS Law”: An Oxymoron, or from 
Cooperation, via Consolidation, to Codification, 6 BRICS L.J. 6, 14 n. 49 (2019).  
329. First introduced in the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
330. OKEREKE, CHUKWUMERIJE GLOBAL JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: ETHICS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 137 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
331. Nicolaas Schrijver, Managing the Global Commons: Common Good or 
Common Sink?, 37(7), THIRD WORLD Q. 1252–1267 (2016). 
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to a different approach to “global superpowering” by countries like China, 
at least from an environmental perspective.  Whilst China has already 
challenged the lex lata by acting or at least arguing de lege ferenda as a 
norm entrepreneur but in an exploitative fashion in other fields broadly 
considered as “commons”—such as outer space security and maritime 
delimitations, especially with regards to its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ)332—Beijing seems placed more promisingly with regards to the 
atmosphere and Earth’s environmental resources.  One last element to be 
mentioned here concerns China’s participation in multilateral efforts to 
deploy space satellite technology as to measure the concentration of toxic 
emissions and make States answerable under IEL;333 whether this would 
prove auxiliary to cultural-heritage preservation, too, remains to be seen, 
not only in terms of identifying polluting activities insisting on heritage 
locations, but more specifically as far as international legal mechanisms are 
concerned, that is, in retailoring liability schemes. 
 
VI.3    China’s sovereignty and transboundary environmental damage 
 
Upholding the generally recognised principle that international duties 
of non-intervention prevent any sort of interference with the political, 
socioeconomic and cultural life of other States,334 the damage to cultural 
heritage through transboundary pollution might be reinterpreted as undue 
interference in the sovereignty of third countries.  The same interference is 
produced when global phenomena are at play. 
In keeping with its orthodox international affairs’ rhetoric, China 
qualifies its subscription to—or endorsement of—international 
environmental instruments by stressing the term sovereignty;335 as the latter 
can be argued from any side, this is a double-edged game to play.336  For 
example, a stress on “sovereignty” in climate change law may equally 
underpin polluting countries (whose sovereignty should not be infringed 
upon with restraints, limitations, blames, sanctions, investigations, and so 
 
332. Carla Park Freeman, An Uncommon Approach to the Global Commons: 
Interpreting China’s Divergent Positions on Maritime and Outer Space Governance, 241 
CHINA Q., 1, 15–16 (2020), https://perma.cc/Y4R3-ZMJG. 
333. See Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty & Anna Huggins, Satellite Measurement of GHG 
Emissions: Prospects for Enhancing Transparency and Answerability under International 
Law, 8(2) TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 303, 314 (2019). 
334. BRADLY J. CONDON, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE 
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 250–51 (2006). 
335. See, e.g., Wang Yi Attends Global Pact for the Environment Summit MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/492C-VZNL; Xiao Hong, 
China Lauds UN Environment Pact, CHINA DAILY, https://perma.cc/AW99-GAL4 (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2017).  
336. LINDA HAJJAR LEIB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL, 
THEORETICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 127 (2011). 
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forth) and polluted ones (whose sovereignty is violated any time they have 
to bear the consequences of pollution produced elsewhere).  Over time, 
both meanings may turn out useful for a country to rely upon in different 
sets of circumstances.  Building on this observation, how may China better 
project the environmentalist image of its contribution to climate 
governance, whilst at the same time protecting its sovereignty-centred 
narratives?  The risk-allocation discourse provides an insightful model, 
whereby China cannot admit fault for transnational pollution cases, nor can 
it accept its own territory being polluted by third States, and the solution 
lies in fault-free regimes where States do not officially accept liability yet 
they allocate resources to common funds to be “automatically” employed 
in the event of an environmental accident.  Quite remarkably, the Chinese 
delegation did not oppose the Global Pact for the Environment whose 
Enabling Resolution was introduced by France at the UNGA in 2018; 
whilst distancing itself from other countries’ claims that the Pact would 
have constituted an unprecedented encroachment upon States’ sovereignty, 
Beijing explicitly endorsed the French concerns and even “pardoned” the 
inadequate consultation of the Group of 77+China’s chairperson.337  In 
other words, China does not see any paradox in supporting international 
liability schemes versus domestic ones, insofar as the former “combine a 
duty of operators to provide financial security and guarantees for potential 
compensation claims with subsidiary industry- and/or State-sponsored 
funds;”338 these are the classical private international law modi operandi,339 
as such what is missing or uncertain is the public dimension of the same 
mechanisms (liability of States themselves, as well as individual non-
criminal liability directly under international law, which would be quite 
revolutionary a legal solution). 
 
VII.  Tentative conclusions 
 
This article endeavoured to be one of the first-ever attempts to unpack 
the way in which responsibility-independent340 IEL liability schemes might 
be transposed into the protection of cultural heritage worldwide—yet 
operating the necessary distinctions between the non-overlapping 
rationales underpinning these two protecting regimes—and what benefits 
 
337. Aguila, supra note 144, at 20–22. 
338. Alexander Proelss, Polluter-Pays, A GLOBAL PACT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 85, 92 (Yann Aguila & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019)  
339. See generally Guillaume Laganière, Liability for transboundary pollution in 
private international law: A duty to ensure prompt and adequate compensation, Ph.D. thesis 
22, 89, 119 (McGill University, 2020), https://perma.cc/TBT7-GAT6.  
340. “Faultless,” “fault-free,” or “no-fault” in domestic-law jargon.  See, e.g., JULIO 
BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 n. 97 
(2011). 
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and hurdles that transposition would encode.  Further study is needed to 
determine how said transposition may find applicability in factual 
scenarios; research building on this first theoretical attempt will need to 
explore who is liable (and not necessarily responsible) for cultural heritage 
damages under environmental law (or partly under such regime) when the 
latter are caused by third state and non-state actors, at times jointly with 
state and non-state actors of the primary State.  Perhaps some model 
applications of the Coase theorem to scenarios where environmental 
liability schemes might serve to protect cultural heritage may help, too, as 
other scholars have tried to accomplish in different fields of environmental 
regulation.341  Three core issues are: what compensation is due; how the 
quantum is determined; and what differences arise between “the commons” 
and “ordinary” heritage.  Nonetheless, all the preliminary considerations 
above allow us to essay a couple of provisional conclusions.  Our hope is 
that they will serve as a springboard for new scholarship, less stuck in old-
fashioned responsibility problems but rather projected towards concrete 
resolutory alternatives. 
Internationally, the current cultural heritage law regime appears 
unequipped to face the contemporary challenges; an analysis of UNESCO 
conventions and other relevant documents has shown that such regime is 
unbalanced in favour of wartime damages to tangible heritage, thus failing 
to thoroughly address peacetime damages, destruction of intangible 
legacies, and attacks against sites where nature and heritage conflate 
unmissably.  IEL is not fully equipped either, and yet, despite most liability 
schemes resolving in political decisions, if one of the two regimes is to be 
updated, the environmental one is perhaps more advisable an option in 
terms of doctrines, legal tools, and trends.342  On top of that, a fund-based, 
compensation-without-fault approach is well received also by those who 
maintain a property-centred approach to heritage and the environment; in 
fact, “[w]hile continuing to oppose global regulatory schemes, which may 
pose their own threats to property rights and individual liberty, [Free 
Market Environmentalism] adherents should consider the viability of 
various international compensation or indemnification mechanisms.”343 
As for China, it generally champions the concept of faultless liability, 
that is, a type of liability which does not depend on the defendant being 
subjectively responsible for the act under scrutiny.  The relevant assessment 
is not “whether the damage that occurred represented the materialisation of 
 
 341. See, e.g., Tamar Meshel & Moin A. Yahya, International Water Law and Fresh 
Water Dispute Resolution: A Coasean Perspective, 92(2) UNIV. OF COLO. L. REV. (2021). 
342. E.g., by integrating specific cultural-heritage clauses within the liability section 
of environmental agreements. 
343. Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate 
Change, 26(2) SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, 296, 316 (2009). 
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one of the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent,”344 but merely 
whether causation exists between the damage and the defendant’s 
(in)actions.  When it comes to transboundary damage, China sympathises 
with the introduction of hybrid multilateral public-private liability schemes 
(provided they do not result in naming-and-shaming attitudes against the 
PRC) whilst retracting from establishing its own domestically (grounded in 
extraterritoriality), which also precludes bilateral recognition.345  To the 
contrary, as far as climate change is concerned, Beijing privileges domestic 
targets346 but remains wary of—or at least, lukewarm about—binding 
liability solutions internationally (unless they come in the model of the 
Multilateral Fund attached to the Montreal Protocol, examined supra). 
This bifurcation proves highly problematic for the sake of our 
discussion, as protecting heritage through IEL means relying on state 
liability schemes addressing both issues, whose effects are often integrated 
and escalate each other. After all, why should a “developing” country like 
China contribute to multilateral funds, beyond reputational gains?  For 
example, accepting the need for such contribution is easier when 
considering heritage of universal value through the prism of the commons, 
in such a way that wherever they are located, and the loftier the ambitions 
of China as a potential superpower, the more such outstandingly valuable 
heritage is somehow “Chinese” as well (although, as we have already 
discussed, sorting “universal” heritage from “ordinary” one is controversial 
an exercise).  Also, those funds could be designed differently from others 
where all participants or potential beneficiaries are required to regularly 
(preventively) contribute regardless of contingent necessity: a need-based 
 
 344. Donal Nolan, Deconstructing the Duty of Care, 129 L. Q. REV. 559, 575 (2013). 
345. “With the exception of the treaties the countries participate in for civil liability, 
China, Korea and Japan have largely remained outside of the transnationalization of 
environmental law, specifically, and even civil law, generally.  Overall, there is lower 
“interoperability” of national court systems in Northeast Asia [compared to North America].  
Even in commercial disputes, Asian plaintiffs generally do not participate in the grand 
American tradition of forum shopping. Strict reciprocity is still required for the recognition 
of foreign judgments in the three countries, discouraging foreign plaintiffs’ recourse to 
justice in the region. [. . .] In Northeast Asia, [. . . s]tate practice has consistently emphasized 
diplomatic channels to address transnational concerns, particularly in the field of 
transboundary pollution.”  Laura S. Henry et al., From Smelter Fumes to Silk Road Winds: 
Exploring Legal Responses to Transboundary Air Pollution over South Korea, 11(3) WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV., 565, 607 (2012).  
346. See also Deng Haifeng [邓海峰], China, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 112, 125–135 (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012).  It shall 
be emphasised that these are indeed targets: “there is still relatively little political appetite 
in China to pass a climate change law, and [. . .] any climate litigation that emerges is likely 
to take a more peripheral route, for example, by focusing on issues of air pollution,” which 
are a purely domestic matter displaying a domestic plaintiff versus a domestic defendant 
arguing domestic incidents.  See Jacqueline Peel & Jolene Lin, Transnational Climate 
Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South, 113(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 693 (2019). 
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arrangement might be thought of instead, where money and other forms of 
assistance are provided on occasion by selected participants, according to 
quotas previously negotiated – this solution, however, would be slightly 
more time-consuming in the event of an actual disaster, as the money could 
not be dispensed automatically. 
Needless to say, the present analysis has focused on fairly numerous 
but still selected segments of China’s posture in international law and 
international relations, whilst many more elements warrant to be dissected 
and analysed.347  For this reason, we call for further research on this topic, 
aimed at validating or disproving the aforementioned claims by means of 
alternative doctrinal standpoints, possibly with the auxilium of empirical 
datasets, and in light of the never-obvious trajectory of the PRC in its 
endeavour to appoint itself as a (responsible?) shaper of the global legal 


















347. For example, the liability of China for environmental degradation resulting from 
Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) infrastructure projects impacting cultural heritage would 
be worth exploring: some UNESCO-listed sites (like “Silk Roads: the Routes Network of 
Chang’an-Tianshan Corridor”) belong indeed to the same BRI concept.  See, Jingkui Jiang, 
Silk Road Cultures and the Silk Road Economic Belt, CHINA’S GLOBAL REBALANCING AND 
THE NEW SILK ROAD 15 (B. R. Deepak [狄伯杰] ed., 2018); see also Tang Xiaoyang, Co-
evolutionary Pragmatism: Re-examine “China Model” and Its Impact on Developing 
Countries, 29(126) J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 853, 867–868 (2020); Marina Lostal &, 
Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, The Bamiyazation of Cultural Heritage and the Silk Road 
Economic Belt: Challenges and Opportunities for China, 3(2) CHINESE J. OF COMP. L. 329 
(2015).  Interestingly, “Beijing has in the past made promises to ‘green’ the One Belt One 
Road.  But in his historic address to the U.N. General Assembly, Xi made no mention of 
China’s foreign projects. [. . .] A green One Belt One Road would be an even more dramatic 
proposition that the original coal-based version.”  Adam J. Tooze, Welcome to the Final 
Battle for the Climate, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/2MF3-ZFCH. 
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